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As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As
a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law
beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work
to strengthen legal education.'

I.

INMODUCTION

The West Virginia Law Review published an article in its Summer
1988 issue which advocated that the West Virginia laws of intestate
succession and "forced or elective" share be revised. 2 Given the various empirical studies published over the last three decades regarding

1. W. VA. Ruiss op PRom-SSONAL CONDUCT (1990) (Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities).
2. Fisher, Spousal PropertyRights - "TilDeath Do They Part, 90 W. VA. L. Rnv. 1169 (1988).
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distribution of assets at death, opining that our current laws of intestate succession needed reform was not a difficult challenge. These
studies, which will be discussed herein, establish that current statutory provisions, which reflect the societal needs of Thomas Jefdo not reflect the economic reality
ferson's agrarian society, simply
3
nor the social needs of today.
The effort to reform intestate succession statutes gained nationwide attention in 1969 with the promulgation of the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and its approval by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. The Uniform Probate Code has been
adopted in whole or in part by fifteen states.4 A second generation
Uniform Probate Code has now been drafted by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. This Revised Uniform Probate Code (RUPC)
reflects an effort by its drafters to provide a reasonable compromise
for the distribution of the assets of one who dies intestate. The drafters based their decisions on the empirical data and the experience
gained under the Uniform Probate Code.
Similarly, the redefinition of property fights when a marriage
ends in a divorce, now characterized by the equitable distribution of
marital assets,5 is not reflected in West Virginia's current elective

3. See generally id. at 1170-72 (discussing the origins of the relevant West Virginia statutes).
4. The fifteen states which have adopted the UPC in whole or in part are:

1972
Alaska ..........................................................
Arizona ......................................................................... 1973

Colorado ....................................................................... 1973
Florida .......................................................................... 1974
1976
H awaii ................................................................
Idaho ............................................................................ 1971
1976
Kentucky ..............................................................

M aine ........................................................................... 1979

M ichigan ....................................................................... 1978
M innesota ...................................................................... 1974
1974
M ontana ...............................................................
Nebraska ....................................................................... 1974
M exico .......................................................................... 1975
1973
Dakota ................................................................

Utah ............................................................................. 1975
5. See LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-1, -2, -13,
-15, -16, -17, -32 to -36 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
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share statute. 6 While on the one hand, the case of Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank 7 addressed fundamental issues and charted a
new direction for spousal elective share rights, the augmentation of
the probate estate on a case-by-case basis adopted therein creates
very real problems for estate planners. In addition, the Johnson approach will encounter the same tracing problems which plagued the
original Uniform Probate Code's augmented estate concept. As discussed infra, the RUPC avoids tracing problems by combining the
spouses' assets to compute the augmented estate, as well as providing
the predictability which is lacking in the Johnson approach. The
"simplified" augmented estate of the RUPC is combined with an
incremental vesting concept to reduce the incidents of "windfall"
which had become a problem of short duration, late in life second
marriages under the Uniform Probate Code. The RUPC also seeks
to achieve sufficient computational certainty and predictability of
application so that estate planners can provide reasonable guidance
to their clients. Equally significant is the problem facing an attorney
who is asked to advise the surviving spouse concerning his or her
rights. The result of computational certainty and predictability should
significantly reduce the incidents of litigation and the accompanying
cost.
Two unrelated developments coalesced to make significant reform
of the current laws of intestate succession and elective shares in West
Virginia a realistic possibility. In 1988, the West Virginia Legislature
created the West Virginia Law Institute "as an official advisory law
revision and law reform agency of the State of West Virginia." '8 At
its meeting on January 11, 1989, the West Virginia Law Institute's
Council, its governing body, selected the revision of West Virginia's
law of intestate succession and elective share as its first project. The
West Virginia Law Institute Council appointed an advisory committee for this project. This committee included members of The
West Virginia State Bar's Probate Committee and representatives of

6. See W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
7. 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1989); See Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance:An Equitable

Solution, 92 W. VIA. L. REv. 441 (1989-90) (authored by Scott A. Curnutte).
8. W. VA. CODE § 4-12-1 (1990).
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a variety of other interested groups. Lay representatives helped to
assure a diversity of background and experience.
The second development was that the Joint Editorial Board for
the Uniform Probate Code began a revision of the 1969 edition of
the Uniform Probate Code. The drafters of this revision have paid
particular attention to those sections of Article II involving intestate
succession and elective share. Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, the
Director of Research for the Joint Editorial Board, provided the
West Virginia Law Institute's Advisory Committee with the draft
provision of these sections so as to make it possible for the West
Virginia Advisory Committee to keep abreast of the discussions and
developments on the national scene.
After an intensive review and discussion, the West Virginia Law
Institute Advisory Committee reported to the West Virginia Law Institute Council at its annual meeting on April 26, 1990. With only
a few minor exceptions, the Advisory Committee endorsed in concept
the provisions set forth in the relevant portions of the RUPC. These
exceptions will be discussed herein. The Law Institute Council accepted the Advisory Committee's report and recommendation and
authorized the drafting of legislation based upon the Revised Uniform Probate Code.
As indicated above, given the previous studies, it is not difficult
to demonstrate that the existing West Virginia intestate succession
statutes do not comport with the "average" persons' wishes for the
distribution of his or her property at death. Since empirical studies
show that a majority of people die intestate, 9 the importance of the
best possible solution for intestate succession cannot be overstated.
In comparison to the number of intestate successions, the number
of elective share cases are relatively few. However, when such a dispute does arise, it exacts a heavy toll on the participants. While the
decision in the Johnson case has redefined the surviving spouses'
elective share rights in a manner consistent with the augmented estate
concept, it also underscores the importance of reasonable predict-

9. See infra text accompanying note 28.
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ability for estate planners as well as those who advise the surviving
spouse.
While it may be easy to gain a consensus that these subject areas
need reform, it does not necessarily follow that there will be a consensus as to the best solutions. Given the fact that both intestate
succession and elective share situations present an infinite number
of variables and have the potential for evoking strong emotional
reactions, obtaining a compromise solution is not easy.
Essentially everyone is able to relate to a problem of a friend or
relative and then judge the solution by how well or how poorly it
solved that particular problem. If such an anecdotal standard is applied, the drafting of an acceptable statute is doomed to failure.
Therefore, in order to obtain a consensus, reasonable compromise
is essential. To the extent a reasonable statute of intestate succession
does not adequately meet one's unique or specific need, a will or
appropriate will substitute must be viewed as the solution. On the
other hand, unless we, as a society, are willing to let the courts
resolve every elective share case following equitable principles on a
case by case basis, then a "fair" rule with a reasonable amount of
predictability and capable of nonjudicial application is a necessity.
It is submitted that the RUPC comes closer to satisfying the competing and conflicting interests and needs than any other statutory
solution.
It is important to note that the RUPC contains eight articles and
includes comprehensive provisions dealing with intestate and testate
succession including the formality of wills and rules of construction,
probate administration and procedures, non-probate transfers and
ancillary matters. Article II of the RUPC, which addresses intestate
succession, was revised by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in cooperation with the Joint Editorial
Board of the Uniform Probate Code. Elective shares and wills is the
focal point of the current revision. The West Virginia Law Institute
project and this discussion will focus on the first two parts of Article
II.10 A companion article which discusses part 3 of Article II, "Spouses
10. Part 1, Intestate Succession & Part 2, Elective Share of Surviving Spouse. The other parts
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And Children Unprovided For In Wills," appears in this issue. Part
3 was also discussed by the Advisory Committee. The decision to
restrict the Law Institute's project to intestate succession and elective
share, with ancillary provisions, reflects a policy decision to address
the subject area"most in need of legislative attention. Therefore, the
decision to limit the Law Institute project is not intended to suggest
or infer that the other parts of Article II are not deserving of careful
consideration for adoption.
This article will discuss and compare the provisions of the RUPC
as approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the case and statutory law of West Virginia.
At the conclusion of each comparative discussion, the position of
the Advisory Committee to the West Virginia Law Institute will be
stated. While the West Virginia Law Institute Council has authorized
drafting of legislation patterned after the RUPC, it has not formally
taken a position on those relatively minor issues where the advisory
committee recommends a departure from the provisions contained
in the RUPC.
II.

REVISED UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, PART 1

The prefatory note to Article II of the Revised Uniform Probate
Code notes that in the years since the Uniform Probate Code was
promulgated in 1969 the few amendments to the code have been
relatively minor. Over the last several years, the Joint Editorial Board
for the UPC has been engaged in a general and extensive review
which was warranted in light of the following four developments
which have occurred since the adoption of the UPC:
(1) the decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving policies; (2) the recognition
that will substitutes and other inter-vivos transfers have so proliferated that they
now constitute a major, if not the major, form of wealth transmission; (3) the

of Article II are: Part 3, Spouse and Children Unprovided For in Wills; Part 4, Exempt Property
and Allowances; Part 5, Wills, Will Contracts, and Custody and Deposit of Wills; Part 6, Rules of
Construction Applicable Only to Wills; Part 7, Rules of Construction Applicable to Donative Dispositions in Wills and Other Governing Instruments; Part 8, General Provisions Concerning Probate
and Nonprobate Transfers; Part 9, Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities; Time Limit on Options in
Gross, etc.; and Part 10, Uniform International wills Act. See REviSED UNroam PROBATE CODE, at
5-8 (Draft 1990) (Revised Table of Sections).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

advent of the multiple-marriage society, resulting in a significant fraction of the
population being married more than once and having stepchildren and children
by previous marriages[;] and [(4)] in the acceptance of a partnership or maritalsharing theory of marriage."

As will be seen below, the RUPC has responded to these developments and all of their ramifications with reasonable and responsible solutions. In effect, the second generation UPC is not only
refining the original version, but where necessary, taking an entirely
new approach in order to provide better solutions to age old problems.
A.

Section 2-101 Intestate Estate
Section 2-101 provides for the distribution of that portion of the
testator's estate not disposed of by his will. It allows the testator,
by will, to exclude an heir from sharing in the intestate estate. This
represents one of the few new subject areas covered in the RUPC. 2
This new provision permits "negative wills." The connotation of
"negative wills" is unfortunate; in fact, this provision is designed
to give effect to a testator's expressed intentions. An enlightening
summary of the subject area is found in "The Intestate Claims of
Heirs Excluded by Will: Should 'Negative Wills' Be Enforced?"' 3 In
essence, the author of this note argues in favor of the "English Rule"
which enforces a "negative will" where (1) the testator clearly intended to exclude an heir or to limit an heir's share in the estate to
the devise in the will, and (2) at least one other heir remained eligible
to take the property that passes by intestacy. 14 The doctrinal basis
of the English rule is that there is an implied gift of the excluded
heirs share under the laws of intestacy to the testator's other heirs.
In contrast, the "American Rule" essentially ignores the testator's
11. Id. at 9 (Prefatory Note to Article II Revisions). See infra note 135 and accompanying

text.
12. REvisED UNFORM PROBATE CODE [hereinafter RUPC] § 2-101(b):

A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to
succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that individual or
a member of that class survives the decedent, the share of the decedent's intestate estate
to which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual or each
member of that class had disclaimed his [or her] intestate share.
The RUPC is reprinted in the appendix to this article.
13. 52 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 177 (1985).
14. Id. at 177.
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expressed intention by holding that a testator may prevent an heir
from receiving his or her share of any property that passes by intestacy only by affirmatively disposing of the entire estate through
15
a will.
The author of this law review note summarizes the court's justification of the American Rule as follows:
Courts that refuse to enforce negative wills offer three principal justifications for
this limitation on testamentary freedom: (1) negative wills would create an undesirable "mixing" of the probate and intestacy systems by requiring courts to
alter the distribution scheme provided in the intestacy statute; (2) because negative
wills do not expressly indicate who should receive the excluded heir's share of the
property that passes by intestacy, their enforcement would in effect require courts
to draft new wills for testators; and (3) negative wills are inconsistent with the
law of succession, which generally provides that property not disposed of by the
6
will shall descend as provided in the intestacy statute.

The author discusses each of these contentions and concludes there
are no important policy reasons underlying the American Rule which
justify frustrating the testator's expressed intent.
It should be emphasized that this concept becomes applicable only
in those instances in which the testator's intent to exclude an heir
is established. As the comment to section 2-101 of the RUPC states:
"Whether or not in an individual case the decedent's will has excluded or limited the right of an individual or class to take a share
7
of the decedent's intestate estate is a question of construction.'
The probability of encountering a purely negative will is remote.
Most likely, such an occurrence would involve a holographic will by
a person not versed in the law. An example of a purely negative
will would be testamentary language such as "none of my property
is to go to my brothers or sisters." If such a testator dies unmarried,
but survived by brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews, but
without any surviving descendants or parents, the question is who
inherits. Under the "American Rule," the only way the testator's
intent would be honored is if the testator had positively disposed of

15. Id. at 180.
16. Id. at 186.
17. RUPC § 2-101, comment.
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his estate. Otherwise, it would pass to his brothers and sisters, even
though he had expressly stated his desire that his brothers and sisters
should not take any portion of his estate. The "English Rule" would
give effect to the testator's intent by recognizing an implied gift of
the brothers' or sisters' share to the brothers' and sisters' children,
i.e. the testator's nieces and nephews.
The far more likely application of this section would be in cases
of partial intestacy. Again, assume an unmarried testator without
surviving descendants or parent(s), but with surviving brothers and
sisters and nieces and nephews. Further assume the testamentary language provided that the brothers and sisters were not to take any
portion of the estate, or the brothers and sisters were given a specific
devise "and no more." If the will does not dispose of all the property
by specific devise and does not contain a residuary clause which
successfully disposes of the balance of decedents estate, then a portion of the estate will pass pursuant to the laws of intestacy." Again,
the question is whether the brothers and sisters should take that
portion of the estate passing by intestacy. According to the author
of the law review note, "at present, only two American jurisdictions
permit a negative will to foreclose the award of an intestate share
of an excluded heir."' 19
West Virginia apparently follows the "American Rule" which
does not recognize negative wills, but there are no recent cases directly on point. The case which most resembles the issue of negative
wills is Boisseau v. Aldridges.20 The will in that case was almost
entirely a "negative will" because its function was to disinherit two
sisters. The only disposition was $500 to each sister if they survived
their respective husbands. The court held that the testator could not
disinherit his heirs in any way other than by positively transferring
his property to someone else and, since the will did not dispose of
his estate, the estate passed according to the intestacy statutes. 2' In
this case, the sisters he wished to exclude were allowed to take.

18. See Green v. Mullins, 146 W. Va. 958, 124 S.E.2d 244 (1962).
19. Note, supra note 13 at 178.
20. 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 222 (1834).
21. Id. at 222-25, 244-49.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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Two more recent cases contain language which supports this rule.

The court in Ball v. Ball,2 noted:
A man can disinherit his heirs only by unmistakably giving his estate to some one
else. This principle results from the nature of property; for property is the creature
of law, and the law will dispose of it, unless, under the permission which the law
gives the owner to make a will, he disposes of it.Y

Also in support of the "American Rule," the court in Harmer
v. Boggess4 stated, "No matter how strong the intention of the tes-

tator may be to disinherit an heir, the intention cannot be given any
effect as to intestate property, and the only method of disinheriting

him is to give the property to someone else."' 5
It should be noted, however, that these more recent cases involve
attempts to determine the intent of the testator rather than consideration of clear expressions designed to exclude heirs, i.e. "negative
wills."

26

In light of the above cases, the adoption of the provision of
RUPC 2-101(b) would alter existing West Virginia case law. The use
of the word "disclaimed" in section 2-101(b) is important. If in fact
the excluded individual(s) predeceased the decedent (testator), then
this provision would not apply. 27
22. 136 W. Va. 852, 69 S.E.2d 55 (1952).
23. Id. at 860, 69 S.E.2d at 60.
24. 137 W. Va. 590, 73 S.E.2d 264 (1952).
25. Id. at 596, 73 S.E.2d at 267 (quoting Tea v. Millen, 101 N.E. 209, 211 (Ill.
1913)).
26. But cf. Barker v. Haner, IIl W. Va. 237, 161 S.E. 34 (1931).
27. The following example is provided in the comment to illustrate the application of this
provision. In the example, Hector is G's brother and is the "excluded heir." G is the decedent.
Subsection (b) establishes the consequence of a disinheritance - the share of the decedent's intestate estate to which the disinherited individual or class would have succeeded
passes as if that individual or class had disclaimed the intestate share. Thus, if the decedent's
will provides that brother Hector is to receive $50.00 and no more, Hector is entitled to
the $50.00 devise (because Hector is not treated as having predeceased the decedent for
purposes of testate succession), but the portion of the decedent's intestate estate to which
Hector would have succeeded passes as if Hector had disclaimed his intestate share. The
consequence of a disclaimer by Hector of his intestate share is governed by Section 2801(d)(1), which provides that Hector's intestate share passes to Hector's descendants by
representation.
Example: G died partially intestate. G is survived by brother Hector, Hector's 3 children
(X, Y, and Z), and the child (V) of a deceased sister. G's will excluded Hector from sharing
inG's intestate estate.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 93

The advisory committee supports the adoption of this section.
B.

Section 2-102 Share of Spouse
1.

Empirical Studies

If judged by the number of people affected, there are no more
important provisions in the RUPC than those providing for intestate
succession. All three of the major empirical studies 28 which have investigated this aspect of probate matters have determined that more
people die intestate than testate. 29
It is not surprising that the frequency of intestacy decreases as an
30
individual's wealth increases.

Solution: V takes half of G's intestate estate. X, Y, and Z split the other half, i.e., they
take 1/6 each. Sections 2- 103(3); 2-106; 2-801(d)(1). Had Hector not been excluded by G's
will, the share to which Hector would have succeeded would have been 1/2. Under section
2-801(d)(1), that half, not the whole of G's intestate estate, is what passes to Hector's
descendants by representation as if Hector had disclaimed his intestate share.
Note that if brother Hector had actually predeceased G, or was treated as if he predeceased
G by reason of not surviving G by 120 hours (see section 2-104), then no consequence flows
from Hector's disinheritance: V, X, Y, and Z would each take 1/4 of G's intestate estate
under sections 2-103(3) and 2-106.
RUPC § 2-101 comment.
28. Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U.
Ca. L. RE V. 241 (1963) [hereinafter Dunham Study]; Note, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive
Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uniform ProbateCodes, 63 IowA L. REv. 1041
(1978) [hereinafter Iowa Study]; Fellows, Simon & Rau, PublicAttitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the U.S., 1978 AM. B. FoUND. Ras. J. 319 [hereinafter
Fellows Study]; Fellows, Simon, Snap & Snap, An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate
Plan, 1976 ILL. L. FoRUM 717 [hereinafter Illinois Study].
29. In reviewing the probated estates in Cook County, Illinois from 1931 to 1957, Dunham
showed that 51.5% of these estates were intestate. Dunham Study, supra note 28, at 244 (Table 2).
Of the 600 Iowans interviewed for the 1978 Iowa Study, 51% did not have a will at the time of the
interview. Iowa Study, supra note 28, at 1070 (Table 6). The 1978 Fellows Study involved interviews
with 750 people from five states; 54.6% of those interviewed did not have wills. Fellows Study, supra
note 28, at 338 (Table 4).
30. Dunham, based on 1950 data, showed that 75% of estates of less than $5,000 were intestate
whereas only 4% of estates of $100,000 were intestate. Dunham Study, supra note 28, at 250 (Table

8):
Value of Estate
Below $ 5,000
5,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 24,999
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75.0%
44.0%
37.0%
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Given the frequency of intestate succession, it should be accepted

that a statutory provision which meets the needs of the greatest numbers of those affected should be a primary legislative objective. While
the majority of those who die intestate possess small to moderate

estates, the fact that some substantial estates pass by intestatacy,
either in whole or part, further complicates the drafting of a statutory

solution.
This article will not retrace the origins of West Virginia statutes
on intestate succession. 31 It is sufficient to say that the existing West

Virginia statute which favors children over the surviving spouse 32 is
inconsistent with the empirical studies.
25,000 - 49,999
21.0%
50,000 - 99,999
14.0%
100,000 & over
4.0%
Component I of the Iowa Study reviewed approximately equal numbers of testate and intestate
estates from probate files in Iowa (150 testate, 145 intestate). Component III comprises the responses
of 600 randomly selected Iowa citizens. A study of these estates and responses with reference to the
value of each estate and the percentage of intestacy shows a decrease in intestacy as the value of the
estate increases. Iowa Study, supra note 28, at 1072 (Table 8):
Value of Estate
Percentage of Intestacy
Below $ 5,000
64.0%
5,000 - 9,999
64.0%
10,000 - 24,999
61.5%
25,000 - 49,999
48.507o
50,000 - 99,999
39.0%
100,000 - 249,999
24.0%
250,000 - 500,000
31.00o
500,000 - 1 million
18.5%
over 1 million
0.0%
The Fellows Study reaches the same result as to intestacy and the value of the estate as did
Dunham and the Iowa Study. See Fellows Study, supra note 28, at 338 (Table 4). In the Fellows
Study, the percentage of people who do not have wills decreased from 85.3% for estates of less than
$13,000 to 31% for estates of $100,000 to $500,000. Id.
Value of Estate
Percentage of Intestacy
$0 - $ 12,000
85.3%
13,000 - 24,999
76.4%
25,000 - 49,999
61.2%
50,000 - 99,999
49.8%
100,000 - 500,000
31.0%
Id.
31. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-1-1, -2-1 (1982 & Supp. 1990). See generally Fisher, supra note 2, at
1170-72.
32. See W. VA. CODE § 42-1-1. Section 42-1-1 provides in essence that if a decedent dies survived
by a spouse and children or descendants of children, the child, children or descendant take all the
real estate, subject to a dower interest in the surviving spouse, pursuant to § 43-1-1 (1982). As to
personal property, the issue take 2/3 and the surviving spouse takes 1/3. Id. § 42-2-1.
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The Dunham Study reviewed twenty-two estates in which the decedent was survived by a spouse and children and six estates in which
the decedent was survived by only a spouse. Of these twenty-eight
estates, twenty-seven decedents gave 100% of the estate to the surviving spouse. Of the twenty-two estates in which the decedent was
survived by both a spouse and children, 10000 left the entire estate
to the spouse. 33 In order to further test the finding based on the
probate records, the Dunham Study utilized a limited purpose questionnaire. An analysis of the responses to the questionnaire revealed
that 850o of the respondents indicated they would give 1000%o of the
estate to the spouse if the estate were small ($36,000), but only 2501o
3
would give 100%o to the spouse if the estate were large ($180,000). 1
The age of the children had some effect on the responses, although
the effect was not as significant as the size of the estate. If survived
by a spouse and minor children, 47.50%o of the respondents would
give the spouse 100 0 o of the estate, but 600%o would leave everything
to the surviving spouse if the children had established their own
families. 35 The Illinois Study, however, showed a different result when
adult children were involved. If the decedent had minor children,
53.3°%o of the respondents would give the spouse 1000%o of the estate,
but only 41.2% (compared to 600%o in the Dunham Study) would
give the entire estate to the spouse if the children were adults.36
In both the Iowa Study and the Dunham Study, the percentage
of respondents who would give the spouse with children 100070 of
the estate decreased as the value of that estate increased. Sixty-eight
percent of the Iowa Study respondents would give the spouse 1000o
of a $10,000 estate; the percentage of respondents decreased to 440o
if the estate was $50,000. 37 However, in the Fellows Study, (published
in 1978) the percentage of respondents who would give the spouse
10007 of the estate increased with the size of the estate. This percentage varied from 500%o for estates of less than $13,000, to 61.40/o

33. Dunham Study, supra note 28, at 252-53.
34. Id. at 260. The dollar figures used to categorize estate size reflects the time period of the
study, the early 1960's.
35. Id. at 260-61.
36. Illinois Study, supra note 28, at 728.

37. Iowa Study, supra note 28, at 1089 (results of data obtained in 1978).
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for estates between $50,000 and $99,999 and 60.4% if the estate was

valued over $100,000.38
In a study conducted by Browder, 57.5% of the testators gave
the estate either
the entire estate to the spouse; 89% of the wills 3left
9
both.
or
children,
the
spouse,
the
exclusively to
The tendency to give the surviving spouse 100% of the estate
decreases when the decedent is survived by a spouse and the decedent's child who is not the child of the surviving spouse. When given
the choice of giving the spouse 100% of the estate, 51% to 99% of
the estate, 50% of the estate, or 0% to 49% of the estate with the
decedent's child receiving the remainder of the estate, the most frequent response in the Fellows Study (37.2%) was to give 50% to the
spouse 0 However, 23% of the respondents would give the surviving
spouse 100% of the estate, and 28.9% of the respondents would give
the spouse between 51% and 99% of the estate. Therefore, the Fellows Study reveals that a majority (51.9%) of the respondents would
give the spouse over 50% of the estate rather than divide the estate
equally between the spouse and the decedent's child from a previous
marriage. 1
The respondents in the Iowa Study were asked how they would
divide the estate if the decedent were survived by a spouse, an adult
child of the present marriage and an adult child from a prior marriage. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents would give the spouse
100% of the estate with the average allocation given to the spouse
being 58% of the estate with each child receiving 21 %. 42 When asked
the same question, except that both surviving children were from the
present marriage, 59% of the respondents would give the spouse
100% of the estate with the average allocation being 78% to the
spouse with each child receiving 11%.43 This study seems to indicate
that the respondents believe that the child of a previous marriage
38. Fellows Study, supra note 28, at 364.
39. Browder, The Recent Pattern of Testate Succession in the U.S. and England, 67 MIcH. L.
REV. 1303 (1969).
40. Fellows Study, supra note 28, at 366.

41. Id.
42. Iowa Study, supra note 28, at 1095.
43. Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 93

may need protection from disinheritance by the surviving stepparent,
as well as the belief that the common child and the child of a prior
marriage should be treated equally. Forty-three percent of the respondents in the Illinois Study would distribute the estate equally
between the spouse and the child from a previous marriage and 33.4%
would, under the same conditions, give the spouse more than 50%.44
2. Distribution Under Section 2-102.
a. Distribution when Decedent is Survived by a Spouse or by
a Spouse and Children
The RUPC responds to the empirical data and the collective wisdom and experience of the drafters, by providing a significantly increased share for a surviving spouse and a corresponding reduction
for the decedent's children as compared with the statutory scheme
of states such as West Virginia. In addition, as the comment to
RUPC § 2-102 observes: "This section is revised to give the surviving
spouse a larger share than the original UPC." Section 2-102 of the
RUPC provides:
Share of Spouse. The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:

(1) mhe entire intestate estate if: (i) no descendant or parent of the decedent
survives the decedent; or (ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are
also descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of
the surviving spouse who survives the decedent .... 4

The RUPC and current West Virginia law both provide that if
there is a surviving spouse but no surviving descendants, or surviving
parents, the surviving spouse takes the entire estate. Unlike West
Virginia, under this section, if there are no surviving parents and
the only descendants of either spouse are descendants of the decedent
and the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse takes the entire estate.
If either the decedent or the surviving spouse have descendants as
44. Illinois Study, supra note 28, at 728.
45. RUPC § 2-102(1). See also id. § 2-102 comment: "If the decedent leaves no surviving
descendants and no surviving parent or if the decedent does leave surviving descendants but neither
the decedent nor the surviving spouse has other descendants, the surviving spouse is entitled to all
of the decedent's intestate estate."
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a result of a previous relationship then subparagraphs (3) and (4)
become applicable. Under these subsections, the surviving spouse's
portion of the intestate estate is:
(3) the first [$150,0001, plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate if all
of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse
and the surviving spouse has one or more surviving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent;
(4) the first [$100,000], plus one half of any balance of the intestate estate, if one
or more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.-

The reason for this graduation of both "floor amounts" and
percentage of the balance of the estates is succinctly stated in the
comment to this section. The drafters explain:
If the decedent leaves surviving descendants and if the surviving spouse (but not
the decedent) has other descendants, and thus the decedent's descendants are unlikely to be the exclusive beneficiaries of the surviving spouse's estate, the survivihg
spouse receives the first $150,000 plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate.
The purpose is to assure the decedent's own descendants of a share in the decedent's intestate estate when the estate exceeds $150,000.
If the decedent has other descendants, the surviving spouse receives. $100,000 plus
one half of the balance. In this type of case, the decedent's descendants who are
not descendants of the surviving spouse are not natural objects of the bounty of
the surviving spouse.47

Absent a valid will, the above provision is an attempt to provide
a reasonable solution, based upon the empirical data, of allocating
the estate's assets between a surviving spouse and descendants.
b.

Distribution When Decedent Is Survived by a Spouse and
Parents

The second basic disposition pattern provided in Section 2-102
is when there is a surviving spouse and surviving parent(s), but no
descendants. Again, the empirical studies provide an insight into the
"average person's" preferences in such occurrences. (This occurrence

46. RUPC § 2-102(3)-(4). The bracketed dollar figures are "suggested" figures for the legislature
of each state to consider. The actual dollar figure selected is viewed as a policy consideration for
each legislature.
47. RUPC § 2-102 comment.
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often involves a relatively young couple with a short duration marriage.)
When survived by both a spouse and parents but no children,
73% of the respondents in the Iowa Study would give 100% of the
estate to the spouse with the average allocation to the spouse being
89% of the estate. 48 When the financial need of the parents is taken
into consideration, the percentage of respondents who would give
the spouse 100% of the estate.is significantly affected. Ninety-two
percent of the respondents would give 100% of the estate to the
spouse when the decedent's parents are financially secure. However,
only 54% indicated the spouse should be given 10000 of the estate
when the parents are not financially secure. The average amount of
the estate allocated to the spouse when the parents are financially
secure is 97% compared to 81% when the parents need financial
help. 49
If the decedent is survived by a spouse and mother, 70.8% of
the respondents in the Fellows Study would give 1000o of the estate
to the spouse. 50 The number of years of marriage did not have a
significant overall effect on the responses, although individuals married only one to three years represented the group with the lowest
percentage of respondents allocating 100% to the spouse (63.5 %).5 1
The percentage of respondents in the Fellows Study allocating 1000%a
of the estate to the spouse when the decedent is also survived by a
mother (70.80) is higher than that of the Illinois Study where only
54.4% of the respondents gave 1000/a of the estate to the spouse.5 2
If the decedent is survived by a spouse and both parents, 58.60 of
the Illinois Study respondents would give 1000/a to the spouse. 53
After considering several options for distributing the estate between a surviving spouse and parent(s), the drafters of the RUPC
elected to modify the basic pattern of the original UPC to provide

48. Iowa Study, supra note 28, at 1138.
49. Id. at 1124.
50. Fellows Study, supra note 28, at 351.

51. Id. app. at 388 (tables A2 & A3).
52. Illinois Study, supra note 28, at 726.
53. Id.
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an increased share to the surviving spouse. Section 2-102(2) provides
that the decedents' surviving spouse takes "the first [$200,000], plus
three-fourths of any balance of the intestate estate if no descendant
of the decedent survives the decedent but a parent of the *decedent
survives the decedent. ' 54 In comparison with the original UPC, the
minimum share to the spouse was increased from $50,000 to $200,000
and the percentage of the balance increased from one-half to threefourths. Since very few probate estates will exceed the surviving
spouse's minimum share, the surviving spouse will, as a practical
matter, receive all of the probate estate in the significant majority
of instances. Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, who served as reporter for the RUPC, explains the reason for this particular distribution:
Why not, then, officially grant the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate when
the decedent is childless but leaves a surviving parent? The rationale is that a
childless decedent with a surviving spouse and at least one surviving parent and
with an estate significantly in excess of $243,000 who dies intestate is likely to
have died fairly yoiing and without expecting to have such a large estate. (A
decedent who actually accumulated an estate of this size is likely to be older and
to have a will. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 20, at 336-39, reporting
that, among those surveyed, 69 percent with estates of $200,000 and over had wills
(the $200,000 figure is adjusted for inflation between the time of the publication
of this article and today); and further reporting that 61 percent of those 46-54
had wills, 63 percent -age 55-64 had wills, and 85 percent of those 65 and over
55
had wills, but only 12 percent of those between the ages of 17 and 34 had wills.)

This particular issue illustrates the type of compromise necessary
to draft reasonable and acceptable solutions to complex problems.
As discussed above, empirical studies show that when there is a surviving spouse and parent(s) but no descendants, the surviving spouse
is generally the preferred taker. If, however, the parents have need

or the estate is large (e.g., the result of a tort recovery) then other
objects of one's affections often come into play. In this context, it
is important to keep in mind that jointly owned property with rights

of survivorship, real or personal, does not pass by intestacy. In addition, it is fairly rare for life insurance proceeds or annuities to pass
54. RUPC § 2-102(2).
55. Waggoner, Spousal ProbateRights in a Multiple-MarriageSociety, reprintedin 45 Record
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1989).
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as part of an intestate estate. Therefore, the number of instances in

which the parent(s) will receive a portion of the estate under this
provision will be rare.
Again, the best solution to every situation is a will which expressly
carries out the individual's wishes. However, in the absence of a will,
the RUPC strikes a balance between competing interests which should
prove acceptable to the substantial majority of our citizens.
The advisory committee supports the adoption of Section 2-102
of the RUPC.

C. Section 2-103 Share of Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouse
The RUPC provides for the distribution of the estate which does
not pass to the surviving' spouse as follows:
Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving spouse
under Section 2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse,
passes in the following order to the individuals designated below who survive the
decedent:
(1) to the decedent's descendants by representation;
(2) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if both
survive, or to the surviving parent;
(3) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the decedent's parents or either of them by representation;
(4) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but the
decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of grandparents,
half of the estate passes to the decedent's paternal grandparents equally if both
survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the descendants of the
decedent's paternal grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the descendants taking by representation; and the other half passes to the decedent's
maternal relatives in the same manner; but if there is no surviving grandparent
or descendant of a grandparent on either the paternal or the maternal side, the
entire estate passes to the decedent's relatives on the other side in the same manner
as the halfA6

In comparison to the provision of existing West Virginia law,57
the RUPC is simplified. In order, the estate not received by the

56. RUPC § 2-103(1)-(4).
57. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-1-1, -2-1 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
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surviving spouse passes to (1) descendants; 58 (2) parents, or the surviving parent; (3) descendants of parents; (4) grandparents or descendants of grandparents. In contrast with existing West Virginia
law, the RUPC does not provide for a distribution to relatives more
remote than descendants of grandparents. The elimination of the
more remote relatives as potential takers is the same pattern provided
in the original UPC.
A variety of reasons supports the policy decision to eliminate the
more remote relatives tracing through great grandparents. As the data
presented above reflects, as the size of the estate increases the frequency of intestacy decreases. Second, the mobility of families in
today's society makes tracing remote relatives difficult and for all
practical purposes such remote relatives are strangers to the decedent.
Finally, the cost of tracing, or attempting to trace, the remote relatives is likely to deplete the decedent's estate.
The members of the Advisory Committee found these arguments
persuasive and support the adoption of this provision.
D.

Section 2-104 Requirement that Heir Survive Decedent for
120 Hours

This section provides a time of survival provision similar in effect
to what many attorneys include in wills for their clients. The survival
period provided by the RUPC is 120 hours (i.e. 5 days). More specifically this section provides:
Any individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have
predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property,
and intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined accordingly. If
the time of death of the decedent or of the individual who would otherwise be
an heir, or the times of death of both, cannot be determined, and it is not established that the individual who would otherwise be an heir survived the decedent
by 120 hours, it is deemed that the individual failed to survive for the required

58. RUPC § 2-103 comment:
The word "descendants" replaces the word "issue" in this section and throughout the
revisions of Article II. The term issue is a term of art having a biological connotation.
Now that inheritance rights, in certain cases, are extended to adopted children, the term
descendants is a more appropriate term.
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period. This section is not to be applied if its application would result in a taking
of intestate estate by the state under Section 2-105.19

Estate planners frequently include time of survival clauses in wills
to prevent multiple administration of the decedent's assets in the
event of a common accident situation in which several members of
the same family are injured and die within a few days of each other.
The 120 hour period attempts to provide a reasonable survival period
without unreasonably delaying the administration of the estate. Additionally, this period of time does not disqualify a spouse's intestate
share for the federal estate-tax marital deduction under the provision
of Internal Revenue Code § 2056(b)(3), which allows for a time of
survival provision of up to six months. 6°
The time of survival provision has a broader application than the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 61 which provides a similar solution
only if there is a simultaneous death or no proof that the parties
died otherwise than simultaneously. In fact, the comment to a companion provision in Part 7 of Article II, which deals with Rules of
Construction Applicable to Donative Dispositions in Wills and Other
Governing Instruments, states: "The Joint Editorial Board of the
Uniform Probate and the Drafting Committee to Revise Article II
recommend that the freestanding Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
be revised in accordance with the revisions of this section.''62
Finally it should be noted "[tihe last sentence prevents the survivorship requirement from defeating inheritance by the last eligible
relative of the intestate who survives him or her for any period.' '63
The advisory committee supports adoption of this provision.
E. Section 2-105 No Taker
As one would expect, if there are no heirs to take under section
2-103, the property "escheats" to the State. The applicable provision
is section 2-105 which provides: "If there is no taker under the pro59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. § 2-104.
See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(3) (1988).
See W. VA. CODE § 42-5-1 to -10 (1982).
RUPC § 2-702 comment (section 2-702 parallels section 2-104).
Id. § 2-104 comment.
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vision of this Article, the intestate estate passes to the [state].'' 64
Designating the state as the ultimate or default taker is consistent
65
with existing statutory law in West Virginia.
The Advisory Committee supports adoption of this provision.
F.

Section 2-106 Representation

One of the refiements of the RUPC is in the provision providing
for "representation." For many lawyers this term brings to mind
the terms "per stirpes" and "per capita." Under the "per stirpes"
system, the initial division of the estate is made at the generation
nearest to the decedent regardless of whether there are any members
of that generation who are alive. Each living member of that generation (the one closest to the decedent) receives a share and the
living descendant(s) of each deceased member are given the deceased
members' share. The primary share of the deceased members' share
is divided and re-divided at each succeeding generation of descendants in the same way until all the primary shares are distributed
among living persons. 66 Under a "per capita" system, the initial division of shares is made at the generational level closest to the intestate where one or more persons are alive. All members at this
level receive an equal share, but there is no division to the
"representatives" of the deceased members of that generation. 67
The original UPC adopted what is described as "per capita with
representation," or more accurately, "per capita with per stirpes representation." Shortly after the UPC was approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association, Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner proposed
an alternative to the UPC's per capita system. 68 Professor Waggoner

64. Id. § 2-105.
65. W. VA. CODE § 37-2-1 (1985) ("Whenever any person shall die intestate and without any
heir or next of kin, owning real estate or personal property within this State, the title of such deceased
person therein shall escheat to the State.") See also id. § 42-2-2 (1982).
66. See generally W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3 (1982); Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the
Untform Probate Code's System For Intestate DistributionAmong Descendants, 66 Nw. U.L. Rnv.
626, 628 (1971-72); Kanawha Valley Bank v. Hornbeck, 151 W. Va. 308, 151 S.E.2d 694 (1966).
67. See sources cited, supra note 66.
68. Waggoner, supra note 66, at 626.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

advocated a system of "per capita at each generation." While there
was support for the concept of per capita at each generation, it was
not until the current revision of the Uniform Probate Code that it
was adopted in section 2-106.6 It provides as follows:
(a) If, under Section 2-103(1), a decedent's intestate estate or a part thereof passes
"by representation" to the decedent's descendants, the estate or part thereof is
divided into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving descendants in the
generation nearest to the decedent that contains one or more descendants who
survive the decedent and (ii) then-deceased descendants in the same generation who
left descendants then living, if any. Each then-living descendant in that nearest
generation is allocated one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and
then divided in the same manner among the then-living descendants of the thendeceased descendants as if the descendants already allocated a share and their
descendants had predeceased the decedent.
(b) If, under Section 2-103(3) or (4), a decedent's intestate estate or a part thereof
passes "by representation" to the descendants of the decedent's deceased parents
or either of them or to the descendants of the decedent's deceased paternal or
maternal grandparents or either of them, the estate or part thereof is divided into
as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest
to the deceased parents or either of them or the deceased grandparents or either
of them that contains one or more descendants who survive the decedent and (ii)
then-deceased descendants in the same generation who left descendants then living,
if any. Each then-living descendant in that nearest generation is allocated one share.
The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the same manner
among the then-living descendants of the then-deceased descendants as if the descendants already allocated a share and their descendants had predeceased the
decedent. 70

Since examples are particularly helpful in explaining and comparing

these alternative methods, the illustrations contained in the comment
7
are set forth in the footnote. 1

69. RUPC § 2-106. See also UPC § 2-103 comment:
The Joint Editorial Board gave careful consideration to a change in the Code's system
for distribution among issue as recommended in Waggoner, "A Proposed Alternative to
the Uniform Probate Code's System for Intestate Distribution Among Descendants," 66
Nw. U.L. Ray. 626 (1971). Though favored as a recommended change in the Code by a
majority of the Board, others opposed on the ground that the original text had been enacted
already in several states, and that a change in this basic section of the Code would weaken
the case for uniformity of probate law in all states. Nonetheless, since some states as of
1975 had adopted versions of the Code containing deviations from the original text of this
and related sections, it was the consensus that Prof. Waggoner's recommendation and the
statutory changes that would be necessary to implement it, should be described in Code
commentary.
70. RUPC § 2-106.
71. Id. comment:
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The West Virginia statute essentially provides for a "per capita
with representation" system:

To illustrate the differences among the three systems, consider a family, in which G is the
intestate. G has 3 children (A, B, and C). Child A has 3 children (U, V, and W). Child
B has 1 child (X). Child C has 2 children (Y and Z). Consider four variations.
Variation 1: All three children survive G.
G

I

II
A

U

V

-----------W

I-

B

X

C

Y

Z

Solution: All three systems reach the same result: A, B, and C take 1/3 each.
Variation 2: One child, A, predeceases G; the other two survive G.

II

I
B

[A]

U

V

W

X

C

Z

Y

Solution: Again, all three systems reach the same result: B and C take 1/3 each; U, V,
and W take 1/9 each.
Variation 3: All three children predecease G.

[A]

U

V

[B]

W

X

[C]

Y

Z

Solution: The original UPC and the revised UPC systems reach the same result: U, V, W,
X, Y, and Z take 1/6 each.
The per stirpes system gives a different result: U, V, and W take 1/9 each; X takes
1/3; and Y and Z take 1/6 each.
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Whenever the children of the intestate, or the brothers and sisters of the intestate,
or the uncles and aunts of the intestate, or the brothers, and sisters of any of the
intestate's lineal ancestors of the same degree, come into partition, they shall take
per capita, or by persons; and where, a part of them being dead and a part living,
the descendants of those dead have right to partition, such descendants shall take
per stirpes, or, by stocks, that is to say, the shares of their deceased ancestors;
but whenever the persons entitled to partition, other than those whose shares are
definitely fixed by the statute of descents, are all in the same degree of kindred
to the intestate, they shall take per capita or by persons.7

In Overton v. Heckathorn,7 3 the court held that in applying this
provision the distribution began with the nearest class having one or
more living representatives with the descendants of the deceased
members of the class taking their ancestor's share. 74 Application of
the West Virginia method of distribution to the examples contained
in the comment 75 produces the same result as reached under the original UPC's system. Therefore, adoption of the RUPC, which is sup-

Variation 4. Two of the three children, A and B, predecease G; C survives 0.
G

[B]

[A]

U

v

-w

X

[C]

Y

z

Solution: In this instance, the revised UPC system (per capita at each generation) departs
from the original UPC system. Under the revised UPC system, C takes 1/3 and the other
two 1/3 shares are combined into a single share (amounting to 2/3 of the estate) and
distributed as if C, Y and Z had predeceased G; the result is that U, V, W, and X take
1/6 each.
Although the original UPC rejected the per-stirpes system, the result reached under

the original UPC was aligned with the per-stirpes system in this instance: C would have
taken 1/3, X would have taken 1/3, and U, V, and W would have taken 1/9 each.
The revised UPC system furthers the purpose of the original UPC. The original UPC
system was premised on a desire to provide equality among those equally related. The
original UPC system failed to achieve that objective in this instance. The revised system
(per-capita-at-each-generation) remedies that defect in the original system. Comment to Section 2-106.
72. W. VA. CODE § 42-1-3 (1982).

73. 81 W. Va. 640, 95 S.E. 82 (1918).
74. Id. at 640, 95 S.E. at 82 (syllabus point 3).

75. See supra note 69.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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87

ported by empirical data, 76 will result in a modification of existing
West Virginia law.
The Advisory Committee supports the adoption of the provision
of the RUPC.
G.

Section 2-107 Kindred of Half Blood

The RUPC, which provides that "[rlelatives of the half blood
inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole
blood," remains unchanged from the provision in the original UPC.
The RUPC provision is consistent with the modern view of "family"
that places less emphasis on "blood" relationships and more em78
phasis on the actual family situation.
Adoption of this section of the RUPC would represent a change
79
in existing West Virginia statutory law.
The Advisory Committee supports the adoption of the RUPC
provision.
H.

Section 2-108 Afterborn Heirs

The RUPC definition of afterborn heir, which provides that "[a]n
individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that
time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth,"80 is similar
in purpose to existing West Virginia law. 8' The use of this term gestation in the RUPC, as compared with "conceived" in the original
UPC, and "in the womb of its mother" used in the West Virginia
statute is designed to accommodate advances in medical science which

76. See generally Young, Meaning of "Issue" and "Descendant," 13 ACPC PROBATE NOTES
225 (1988) (cited in RUPC § 2-106 comment).

77. RUPC § 2-107.
78. See generally Note, Premarital Wills and PretermittedChildren: West Virginia Law v. Revised Uniform Probate Code, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 197 (1990) (discussion of adoption).
79. W. VA. CODE § 42-1-2 (1982 & Supp. 1990) ("Collaterals of the half blood shall inherit
only half so much as those of the whole blood. But if all the collaterals be of the half blood, the
ascending kindred, if any, shall have double portions.").
80. RUPC § 2-108.
81. W. VA. CODE § 42-1-8 (1982) ("Any child in the womb of its mother at, and which may
be born after, the death of the intestate, shall be capable of taking by inheritance in the same manner
as if such child were in being at the time of such death.").
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now make possible frozen embryo and in vitro fertilization. The time
of survival period in this section, 120 hours, is consistent with other
provisions of the RUPC .2 Finally, the selection of the word "gestation" demonstrates an intent on the part of the drafters to remain
as consistent as possible with the common law's contemplated "nine
month" period of time.
The Advisory Committee supports the adoption of this provision.
L

Section 2-109 Advancements

The effect of the RUPC provision on advancement is to "revise"
the presumption currently existing under West Virginia law which is
consistent with the common law. The West Virginia statutes83 and
the cases decided thereunder, combine to provide a well-developed
concept of advancements. As defined by our court, an advancement
is an irrevocable gift made to one standing in place of a prospective
heir or distributee with the intention on the part of the donor that
such gift shall represent a part or whole of the share of his estate
to which the donee would be entitled upon the death of the donor
intestate.84 The case law recognizes a rebuttable presumption that the
gift is intended as an advancement. 85 This presumption may be rebutted by competent proof of facts or circumstances sufficient to
establish a different intent on the part of the donor.8 6 The extrinsic
evidence to rebut the presumption may be either written or parole.87

82. See supra note 59.
83. W. VA. CODE § 42-4-1 (1982):

Where any descendant or collateral relative of a person dying intestate as to his estate, or
any part thereof, shall have received from such intestate in his lifetime, or under his will,
any estate, real or personal, by way of advancement, and such descendant or collateral
relative, or any descendant of either, shall come into the partition and distribution of the
estate with the other parceners and distributees, such advancement shall be brought into
hotchpot with the whole estate, real and personal, descended or distributable, and thereupon

such party shall be entitled to his proper portion of the estate, real and personal.
84. See generally Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 122 W. Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 189 (1940);
Hendrick v. Harper, 135 W. Va. 47, 62 S.E.2d 265 (1950).
85. Gaylord, 122 W. Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 189; In re Boggs Estate, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d
497 (1950).
86. See Boggs, 135 W. Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497.
87. Bailey v. Banther, 314 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1983).
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Section 2-109(a) both "reverses" the presumption and deals with
the method of proof. It provides:
(a) If an individual dies intestate as to all or a portion of his [or her] estate,
property the decedent gave during the decedent's lifetime to an individual who,
at the decedent's death, is an heir is treated as an advancement against the heir's
intestate share only if the decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing or the
heir acknowledged in writing that the gift is an advancement or if the decedent's

contemporaneous writing or the heir's written acknowledgement otherwise indicates
that the gift is to be taken into account in computing the division and distribution

of the decedent's intestate estate. 8

As is the case with the present statute in West Virginia,8 9 the

RUPC applies to advances to decedent's collateral relatives as well
as descendants. In addition, the comment to this section makes it
explicitly clear that "tihis section applies to advances to the decedent's spouse." 9
The application to the spouse becomes significant when combined
with the statement that "[t]o be an advancement, the gift need not
be an outright gift; it can be in the form of a will substitute, such
as designating the donee as the beneficiary of the intestate's life insurance policy or the beneficiary of the remainder interest in a revocable intervivos trust." 91 Therefore, under the RUPC, the concept
of advancement is consistent with the modern estate planner's use
of will substitutes.
As to the valuation of an advancement, subsection (b) provides
that, "[flor purposes of subsection (a), property advanced is valued
as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the
property or as of the time of the decedent's death, whichever first
9 2

occurs."

The time of valuation under the RUPC represents a slight modification of West Virginia law. In West Virginia, absent a contrary
88. RUPC § 2-109(a).
89. The West Virginia statute was amended in 1931 to make it applicable to "collateral relatives" as well as "descendants." This amendment overturned the court's decision in Waldron v.
Taylor, 52 W. Va. 284, 45 S.E. 336 (1902), in which the court held the statute did not apply to a
decedent's brother. Id. at 288-93, 95 S.E. at 337-40.
90. RUPC § 2-109 comment.

91. Id.
92. Id.§ 2-109(b).
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intent expressed by the donor, the value of the advancement is ascertained as of the time the advancement is made, if fully effective
at that time, and if not, then when use or possession vests in the
donee. 93
Subsection (c), pertaining to the death of'the recipient of the
property before the donor, also represents a change in West Virginia
law. That subsection provides: "(c) If the recipient of the property
fails to survive the decedent, the property is not taken into account
in computing the division and distribution of the decedent's intestate
estate, unless the decedent's contemporaneous writing provides otherwise. "94

The general rule in West Virginia is that an advancement to a
child which was received as full satisfaction of the child's share is
binding upon the child, his children and their grantees who are all
barred from further participation in the estate. 95 The rationale for
the RUPC position in holding the advancement to a child not binding
on the child's descendants is that "there is no guarantee that the
recipient's descendants received the advanced property or its value
from the recipient's estate.' '96
Section 2-109 does not specify the method of taking an advancement into account. Therefore, the existing West Virginia approach
of bringing the advancement into the "hotchpot" continues. In West
Virginia, the donee who brings advanced property into the hotchpot
retains title to the property, but is charged with its value. 97 If a donee
comes into the hotchpot and the value of the advanced property
exceeds the value of the computed share, the donee is not liable for
any excess, but rather is simply excluded from any distribution from
the estate. 98
The Advisory Committee endorses the adoption of Section 2-109.
93. 122 W. Va. 205, 8 S.E.2d 189.
94. RUPC § 2-109(c).
95. Nel v. Flynn Lumber Co., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523 (1918); Coffman v. Coffman, 41
W. Va. 8, 23 S.E. 523 (1895).
96. RUPC § 2-109 comment.
97. Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S.E. 482 (1892).
98. Neil, 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523.
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J. Section 2-110 Debts to Decedent
This RUPC section, which is essentially the same as the original
UPC, provides that "[a] debt owed to the decedent is not charged
against the intestate share of any individual except the debtor. If the
debtor fails to survive the decedent, the debt is not taken into account
in computing the intestate share of the debtor's descendants."99
The case in West Virginia which most closely resembles the issue
of a debt owed the decedent by an heir is In re Bogg's Estate.100 In
that case, one of the decedent's sons gave the decedent a note for
$2000. The principal was repaid ten years later, but the court found
that the son owed the father net interest of $1,233.84. The court
noted that a debt is not the same as an advancement; an indebtedness
must be repaid in any event while an advancement embraces no obligation to repay. That is, while an heir who has received advancements greater than his intestate share is under no obligation to refund
any part of that excess to the estate, an heir who owed the decedent
a debt must repay the estate the amount such debt exceeds his intestate share. Apparently there is no West Virginia law directly pertaining to the issue of whether such a debt is taken into account in
computing the intestate share of the debtor's descendants. However,
since the language concerning the repayment of the debt in Boggs
is so definite, it could be argued that the West Virginia Court would
require a set off in the share given to the descendants of the indebted
heir. Therefore, while the set off provided in the RUPC against the
debtor is consistent with the Boggs case, it is assumed that, to the
extent this provision restricts the debt to the debtor, it is inconsistent
with existing West Virginia law.
The Advisory Committee opposed the adoption of this provision
on the basis that once a debt is established, as distinguished from
a gift or advancement, it should be viewed as an asset of the decedent's estate for all purposes. If the decedent desired to forgive
the debt as against the debtor's descendants, the decedent could take
appropriate action to achieve such a result.

99. RUPC § 2-110.
100. 135
W. Va.
288, 63 Repository
S.E.2d 497 (1951).
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Section 2-111 Alienage

Section 2-111 provides that "[n]o individual is disqualified to take
as an heir because the individual or an individual through whom he
[or she] claims is or has been an alien."''
The purpose of this section is succinctly explained in the comment:
This section eliminates the ancient rule than an alien cannot acquire or transmit
land by descent, a rule based on the feudal notions of the obligations of the tenant

to the King. Although there never was a corresponding rule as to personalty, the
present section is phrased in light of the basic premise of the
Code that distinctions
t 2
between real and personal property should be abolished. '

Although the wording of this section is somewhat different, the
spirit and purpose of it is the same as found in West Virginia statutes
which are designed to remove the barriers from alien ownership or
°
transfer of land.-D
The Advisory Committee supports the adoption of this provision.
L.

Section 2-112 Dower and Curtesy Abolished

This section succinctly states that "[tihe estates of dower and
curtesy are abolished."'0 4 The comment to this section just as concisely reports: "The provision of this Code replaces the common law
concepts of dower and curtesy and their statutory counterparts. Those
estates provided both a share in intestacy and a protection against
disinheritahce."' 0 5 Except for a renumbering of the section (2-113 to
2-112), the RUPC is exactly the same as the UPC.
An extended discussion of the concepts of curtesy and dower is
beyond the scope of this article.10° For present purposes, suffice it

101. RUPC § 2-111.

102. Id. comment.
103. W. VA. CoDE § 36-1-21 (1985); Id. § 42-1-4 (1982).
104. RUPC § 2-112.

105. Id. comment.
106. 1 Atswac~A LAw oF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1952) introduced the discussion of dower as follows:
Dower at common law was the estate which a widow enjoyed for her life, in one-third of
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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to say that dower took its shape as a part of the evolution of the
property law in feudal England to provide a measure of economic
security and dignity for the surviving widows of the landed gentry.
Curtesy reflected the preeminence of the husband in common law
real property matters. For a little over one half century, a statutory
form of curtesy existed in West Virginia. It was not until the general
revision of the Code in 1931 that curtesy was entirely abolished in
West Virginia.10 7 Upon abolishing curtesy, the husband was given
"dower" rights equal to the wife. 08
West Virginia's statutory dower is essentially common law dower
expanded to include dower in equitably owned property.1°9 In ad-

any time during the marriage, if any, might by a possibility have succeeded. Her interest
was ordinarily independent of rights which she might have by testamentary or intestate
succession; it arose not by contract but by operation of law. During the subsistence of the
marriage the wife had a protected expectancy known as "inchoate" dower, which arose
upon marriage and could not be defeated except for certain defined and limited causes and
in certain definite ways. Upon the death of the husband, her interest became "consummate"
but was not regarded as an estate until actually set off and assigned. After assignment the
estate arose by operation of law and was, in general, subject to the usual incidents of life
estates; it was not subject to the claims of the husband's creditors. The term "dower" has
frequently been used indiscriminately to describe the widow's inchoate and consummate
interests, as well as the estate of dower after assignment.
In a similar manner, it began its discussion of curtesy as follows:
In England at common a husband acquired upon marriage a right to the rents and profits,
together with the use and enjoyment, of all the realty of which his wife was then seised
and of which she thereafter became seised during coverture. His interest, as tenant by the
marital right, was a life interest, measured by their joint lives, which lasted until the dissolution of the marriage or until the birth of issue, but it entitled him to no rights in her
lands after her death. Not until the birth of issue did the husband acquire rights which he
might assert in his wife's lands if he survived her. If issue of the marriage, capable of
inheriting her property, were born alive, he then acquired in her inheritable estates of which
she had actual seisin an interest known as "curtesy initiate," a present estate measured by
his life alone. If he survived her, that interest became "consummate," and he was then
said to be "tenant by the curtesy" during his lifetime.
Id.
107. W. VA. CoDE § 43-1-18 (1982) ("Tenancy by the curtesy is abolished.") For a discussion
of curtesy in West Virginia prior to its abolition, see Note, Tenant By Curtesy - Acts 1921 - Construction, 29 W. VA. L.Q. 199 (1923).
108. W. VA. CoDE § 43-1-1 (1982):
A surviving spouse shall be endowed of one third of all the real estate whereof the deceased
spouse, or any other to his or her use, or in trust for him or her, was, at any time during
the coverture, seised of or entitled to an estate of inheritance, either in possession, reversion,
remainder, or otherwise, unless the right of such surviving spouse to such dower shall have
been lawfully barred or relinquished.
109. Bank v. Dudley, 76 W. Va. 332, 86 S.E. 307 (1915).
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dition to providing a statutory definition, the West Virginia statute
provides for the sale of lands to satisfy an encumbrance;110 explains
how lands may be sold free of inchoate dower; ' establishes proceedings for the release of dower in real estate which the owner has
contracted to sell;" 2 codifies the interrelationship between jointure

and dower;" 3 establishes the rights of the surviving spouse after decedent's death, but before dower is assigned;"14 codifies the right of
the surviving spouse with minor children to the mansion house;" 5
explains how dower is assigned and the remedies for recovery of
dower;"16 provides for a cash award in lieu of dower;"71 and explains

when dower is barred by misconduct."18 In addition to barring dower
for misconduct, the code provides that dower is barred by an
annulment" 9 and by a divorce.'20
As long as real property was the principal asset of the estate, it
is arguable that dower rights afforded adequate financial protection
110. W. VA. CODE §§ 41-1-3, -4 (1982).
111. Id. § 43-1-5 (1982).
112. Id. § 43-1-6 (1982).
113. Id. §§ 43-1-7 to -9 (1982). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Jacobs v. Jacobs,
100 W. Va. 585, 131 S.E. 449 (1926), provides a helpful distssion of "jointure." After tracing its
common law origin, the court explains:
Thus "jointure" was evolved, and has come down to us with changes through the act of
the Assembly of Virginia of 1785, Chap. 65, and the Codes of 1819 and 1860. Sections 4,
5 and 6 of Chap. 65 are the same as Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Chap. 110, Code of Virginia
of 1860. If the estate, real or personal, devised to a widow is intended to be in lieu of her

dower she has a legal jointure, and is required to elect. She must either abandon her dower
or the provision made for her in the will. [Shuman v. Shuman], 9 W. Va. 50, 54. "The
doctrine of election is founded on the same reasons and governed by the same rules when
applied to a widow claiming dower, as when applied in any other case." [Dixon v. McCue],
14 Grat. 540. Pomeroy's Equity Jur. (4th ed.) Secs. 464-5, says that the true basis of the
doctrine of election is founded on the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity.
Id. at 596, 131 S.E. at 453.
114. W. VA. CODE § 43-1-10 (1982).
115. Id. § 43-1-11 (1982).
116. Id. § 43-1-12 to -14 (1982).
117. Id. § 43-1-20 (1982).
118. Id. § 43-1-19 (1982).
119. Id. § 48-2-19 (1986).

120. Id. § 48-2-20 (1986):
When a divorce shall be granted, all rights of either husband or wife to dower shall be
thereby barred; but the court when granting any divorce shall, in every proper case, compel
the guilty party to compensate the innocent party for any inchoate right of dower, in any
then existing property, that may be barred by the divorce; and to secure the payment of
such compensation the court may make such compensation a lien upon the real estate of
the party liable therefor.
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and security for a surviving spouse. Certainly this was true in feudal
times when the widow moved into the dower house or cottage located
next to the manor house on the larger feudal estate. However, in a
society where personal property, life insurance and annuity plans
constitute the principal form of a decedent's wealth, dower represents
no more than an empty promise. It cannot be seriously contended
that the RUPC is not a significant improvement of estate asset distribution over a system that relies upon the concept of common law
dower to define a surviving spouse's share.
"Not only does dower fail to adequately provide for a surviving
spouse in today's economy, it diminishes the alienability of land and
causes nightmares for title examiners." 1 2 1 Another author explained:
"Common-Law dower is a serious obstacle for free commerce in
land and a grave threat to security of title."' Dower's mischief to
land titles lies in the fact it is a nonrecordable right which arises by
the happening of certain events. The omisthe operation of law upon
sion of the nonowning spouses's signature may be the result of an
intentional deception or an "honest" mistake.
As the legislature attempted to address the deficiencies of dower
as an adequate protection for a surviving spouse, it became customary to abolish the common law dower concept because of its adverse
effect upon land titles. In fact, dower in a form which resembles its
common law ancestor does not exist in the significant majority of
states. 1
As the abolition of dower was discijssed within the advisory committee, several members of the committee raised a new concern. While
accepting the above reasons as valid for abolishing dower, the question was raised whether the abolition of dower might make it possible
for a title holder spouse, anticipating a divorce, to more easily conceal his or her assets from the nontitle holding spouse in hopes of
121. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of An
Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. Rzv. 981, 988-89 (1977).
122. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1054 (1966).

123. The following states still recognize either common law or statutory dower: Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia and
West Virginia; also the District of Columbia.
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preventing an equitable distribution of this asset upon divorce. The

concern reflects the fact that currently a married title holding spouse
needs the signature of the nontitle holding spouse (i.e. release of

dower) to convey clear title. However, the existence of inchoate dower
does not prevent such a scoundrel spouse, in many situations, from
deceiving the innocent purchaser to the detriment of the innocent
purchaser without a corresponding benefit to the surviving spouse.
The issue raised is legitimate and the concern is real. It is submitted, however, that the solution is not to perpetuate a concept that

has outlived its usefulness in hopes that it may make a small contribution to the solution of an unrelated but very real problem. The

issue of concealment of assets in divorce proceedings should be addressed directly. If the current law requiring disclosure of assets124
is deficient, it should be amended.'2
If concealed assets are, discovered, the courts equitable powers are
clearly sufficient to tailor an appropriate remedy. 26
It should not be necessary to unduly complicate the attempt to
achieve fair, equitable and reasonable distribution of one's assets at
death in order to facilitate a fair distribution of assets if a divorce
occurs. The objects of both are compatible.
M. Section 2-113 Individuals Related to Decedent Through Two
Lines

The countervailing provision to section 2-107, Kindred of Half
Blood, is section 2-113 which prevents "double inheritance." The
124. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-33 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
125. At the time that this article is going to press, the West Virginia Law Institute Council is
considering a compromise proposal which may satisfy the competing demands in this area. Under
this proposal, a new statute to be adopted with the RUPC would require a married individual to
notify his or her spouse of the conveyance of any property to which dower would have attached
before the adoption of the RUPC. For the purposes of this statute, a Deed of Trust or security
arrangement is considered a conveyance. This requirement would be met by the appearance of the
spouse's signature on the deed or by similarly competent evidence. If the conveying party fails to
notify his spouse of the conveyance, then in the event of a divorce the value of the property so
conveyed would be considered marital property for the purposes of equitable distribution, notwithstanding the fact that the value received for the property may already have been included in the
marital property. Thus, the conveying party has a strong incentive to notify his or her spouse of
such transfers, thereby protecting spouses from efforts to "shed assets" in contemplation of a divorce.
Not only would such a statute protect spouses from pre-divorce fraud, it also retains the advantages
gained from abolishing dower since it would specifically provide that the statute is not to be construed
to constitute a lien upon the underlying property where purchased by a bona fide purchaser.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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section provides: "An individual who is related to the decedent
through two lines of relationship is entitled to only a single share
based on the relationship that would entitle the individual to the
larger share." 127
The comment to the section explains this section would prevent
a double inheritance in the following type of case.1 n A deceased
person's brother or sister marries the spouse of the decedent and
adopts a child of the former marriage. In the event the adopting
parent dies, this provision would prevent the child from taking as
both the natural and adopted grandchild of its grandparents.
While there is apparently no law in West Virginia addressing this
specific issue, the Advisory Committee supports the adoption of this
section.
N.

Section 2-114 Meaning of Child and Related Terms
This provision is discussed in a companion article beginning on
page 197 of this issue of the law review.
0.

Other Provisions of Article II, Part 1.
In addition to the provisions of Part 1 and 2 of Article II of the
RUPC discussed herein and Part 3, discussed in a companion article
beginning on page 197 of this issue, Article II contains several additional parts not currently under review by the West Virginia Law
Institute.
One of the omitted topics, Part 4, provides for exempt property
and allowances. In West Virginia, a homestead exemption and an
exemption of a limited amount of personal property is provided by
a State Constitutional provision'29 which is implemented by sta127. RUPC § 2-113.

128. See id. comment.
129. W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 48:

Any husband or parent, residing in this State, or the infant children of deceased parents,
may hold a homestead of the value of five thousand dollars, and personal property to the

value of one thousand dollars, exempt from forced sale, subject to such regulations as shall
be prescribed by law: Provided, that such homestead exemption shall in no wise affect debts

or liabilities existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution and the increases in
such homestead exemption provided by this amendment shall in no wise affect debt or
liabilities existing at the time of the ratification of such amendment: Provided, however,
that no property shall be exempt from sale for taxes due thereon, or for the payment of
purchase money due upon said property, or for debts contracted for the erection of im-
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tutes.'3 0 The wording of West Virginia's constitutional provisions impacts the law in West Virginia to the extent that the advisory
committee made a policy decision not to consider the provisions of
Part 4 as a part of its current effort to achieve legislation reform.
Since the West Virginia Law Institute's project focuses on the

revision of intestate succession and elective share law as issues of
high priority for legislative attention, some of the companion provisions on other types of donative transactions contained in Article
2 have been omitted from the current proposal.?13

III.

REVISED UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, PART 2: ELECTIVE SHARE
OF SURVIVING SpOUSE

A.

132

Introduction
For centuries people have wrestled with the problem of spousal

disinheritance. 33 For every determined effort to devise an equitable

and foolproof mechanism to prevent disinheritance, there have been
equally determined efforts to disinherit. Separate property
jurisdictions 134 like West Virginia typically prevent spousal disinheritance by a statutory forced share which "guarantees" the surviving
spouse a share (usually one-third) of the decedent's probate estate. 13
130. W. VA. CODE §§ 38-9-1 to -3 (1985 & Supp. 1990). See also id. §§ 38-8-1, -10 (1985 &
Supp. 1990) (the companion and related provisions of §§ 38-9-1 to -3).
131. Part 5, Wills, Wills Contracts and Custody and Deposit of Wills; Part 6, Rules of Construction Applicable Only to Wills; Part 7, Rules of Construction Applicable to Donative Disposition
in Wills and Other Governing Instruments; Part 8, General Provision Concerning Probate and Nonprobate Transfers; and Part 9, Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities; Time Limit on Options in Gross,
Etc.
132. In this discussion of the RUPC elective share provisions, the author relied throughout on
the comments to the Tentative Draft of the RUPC.
13 . See infra text accompanying notes 145-59.
134. It is important to note that forced share law is a consequence of the concept of separate
ownership of marital property. In the ommunity-property states (community of acquests), each spouse
has an immediate one-half interest in the fruits of the marriage in recognition of the collaborative
nature of marriage, and thus a forced share law is unnecessary (except that California and Idaho
have addressed the problem of migratory spouses through the application of a statutory share to
quasi-community property - property acquired elsewhere which would have been community property
if it had been earned in a community-property state). Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's
Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP., PRon. & TR. J. 303 (1987).
135. IIA ScoTT & FATCHmR, THE LAw OF TRusTS § 146A (1988).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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Because these statutes base the surviving spouse's share on the size
of the probate estate, however, they invite evasion: the testator may
simply deplete the probate estate through the use of various "will
substitutes.' 3 6 Moreover, these statutory forced share schemes fail
to adequately accomplish the purposes for which they were designed:
support for the surviving spouse and recognition of the contribution
which the surviving spouse made to the decedent's estate.
There are various approaches to prevent so-called "fraud on the
widow's share,"'13 7 in which the decedent depletes the probate estate
through inter vivos transfers. Many states, including West Virginia,
retain the traditional forced share statute'38 and use a case-by-case
judicial inquiry into the testator's use of various will substitutes:
under this approach property transferred out of the estate is considered part of the probate estate if the conveyance is "illusory,"' 3 9
or if the decedent "intended to defraud"" 4° the surviving spouse of
his marital right in the estate, or if the decedent lacked "present
donative intent"' 4' with respect to the transfer. 42
A more predictable result is achieved by a forced share statute
which mechanically takes into account will substitutes. Professors
Langbein and Waggoner proposed a statutory system of "incremental vesting" of the spouse's share of an augmented estate, 43 which
has now been incorporated into the RUPC. This system increases
over time the share the surviving spouse is entitled to, up to a total
of half of the augmented estate. The augmented estate concept used
136. Will substitutes are devices used to pass property at death outside of the probate process.
Many of them enable the testator to retain a life interest in the property while assuring its exclusion
from the probate estate. The will substitutes most frequently employed include life insurance policies,
employee benefit plans, joint and survivor annuities, joint bank accounts, joint tenancy, P.O.D.
accounts, Totten trusts and revocable inter vivos trusts. See, e.g., Comment, Protection of the Base
for the Surviving Spouse's Election: The Search for an Alternative, 7 CAP. U.L. REv. 423 (1978).
137. See generally W. MAcDoNALD, FRAUjD ON TH

Wmow's SHaRE (1960).

138. W. VA. CODE §§ 42-3-1, 42-2-1, 43-1-1 (1982). West Virginia also retains a statutory form
of dower. See id. § 43-1-1 (1982).
139. See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
140. See, e.g., Warren v. Compton, 626 S.E.2d 12 (Tenn. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 626 S.W.2d
12 (Tenn. 1981).
App. 3d 394, 349 N.E.2d 668 (1976).
141. See, e.g., Toman v. Svoboda, 39 Ill.
142. See Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance:An Equitable Solution, 92 W. VA. L. REv.
441 (1990) (discussing judicial solutions to the problem of "fraud on the widow's share").
143. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 133, at 314-17.
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in this system is derived from that used in the Uniform Probate
Code. The surviving spouse's share is calculated from a combined
estate which is augmented to include "recapturables"' ' 4 such as will
substitutes, thereby preventing the use of these mechanisms to reduce
the surviving spouse's share of the estate. The major advantage of
the RUPC over the UPC approach is that it better accomplishes the
dual purposes of forced share statutes; (1) support, and (2) recognition of contribution by the surviving spouse to the decedent's es45
tate.1
No part of the UPC was more controversial than the provisions
concerning the elective share, and the same is likely to be true of
the RUPC. First, forced share statutes in general encroach on a sensitive area: many people have heard anecdotes wherein a surviving
spouse received substantially more than or substantially less than they
"deserved" because of the operation of forced share statutes. The
augmented estate concept received particular criticism because it was
perceived to be complicated. 146 While many states have simple forced
share statutes which provide a flat one-third share of the probate
estate, the augmented estate provisions of the RUPC detail which
assets are included in calculating the surviving spouse's share of the
estate, and consequently it is much longer than typical forced share
statutes.
Likewise, the incremental vesting concept is likely to attract some
criticism because it establishes cut-off points which are necessarily
arbitrary and because it necessitates a calculation which is not necessary under other forced share statutes. However, the elective share
provisions of the RUPC provide such enormous benefits in terms of
equity,- providing more for the surviving spouse than most forced
share statutes would where more is just, and less where less is
appropriate ' 47 -and predictability that the necessary complexity must
be viewed in its proper scope.

144. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
145. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 131, at 306-10.

146. See, e.g., Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In
Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IowA L. REv. 981 (1977).
147. REVISED UNIFopM PROBATE CODE, at 45 (Draft 1990) (Article II, Part 2, general comment):
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B. History
The protection of a decedent's wife from disinheritance began as

early as the Code of Hammurabi, and can be traced through Roman,
Germanic, Scandinavian and Saxon law. 14 At common law, the surviving spouse was not an heir. 149 Instead, widows were protected by

the device of dower which was a life estate in one-third of all lands
in which her deceased husband was seized of an estate of inheritance
at any time during the marriage.150 A widower, on the other hand,
5
was protected by curtesy if a live child was born of the marriage.1 '

Curtesy consisted of a life estate in all of the wife's inheritable land 152
Neither dower nor curtesy could be defeated by will or inter vivos
conveyance without the cooperation of the other spouse.

51

In an agrarian society in which the major form of wealth was
land, dower worked well to provide economic security for the
widow. 154 As time passed, however, land became "more and more

an article of commerce and less a symbol of status and power,"' 55
and the interference of dower with the alienability of land became
less tolerable. 5 6 Finally, in 1833 England enacted legislation that allowed a husband to defeat his wife's dower by will or by inter vivos
57
conveyance, leaving dower only in the event of intestacy.!

The general effect of implementing the partnership theory in elective-share law is to increase
the entitlement of a surviving spouse in a long-term marriage in cases in which the marital
assets were disproportionately titled in the decedent's name; and to decrease or even eliminate the entitlement of a surviving spouse in a long-term marriage in cases in which the
marital assets were more or less equally titled or disproportionately titled in the surviving
spouse's name. A further general effect is to decrease or even eliminate the entitlement of
a surviving spouse in a short-term later-in-life marriage in which neither spouse contributed
much, if anything, to the acquisition of the other's wealth, except that a special supplemental
elective-share amount is provided in cases in which the surviving spouse would otherwise
be left without sufficient funds for support.
REVMED UNIrMO
PROBATE CODE, at 45 (Draft 1990) Article II, Part 2, general comment.
148. Kurtz, supra note 145, at 983. See also, I C. SCRmNER,A TR.ATisE ON THE LAW OF DOWER
1-22 (2d ed. 1883).
149. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1045 (1966).
150. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HisTORY OF ENGaIs LAW 420-22 (2d ed 1923).
151. Id. at 414.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 409-11, 424.
154. Kurtz, supra note 145, at 985.
155. Id. at 987.
156. Id.
& 4 Will. 4, @
c. WVU,
105, 4.1990
157. Dower
Act,
1833, 3 Repository
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by The
Research
41

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

Common-law dower was part of the received common law of the
original American colonies and most of the states."18 As time passed,
the same problems that led to the end of dower in England prompted
varied legislative responses in America. Often dower and curtesy were
abolished in favor of forced share statutes. 1 9 It is important to note,
however, that significant vestiges of common-law dower remain in
the probate codes of some states: the different treatment of real and
personal property, the one-third share accorded the surviving spouse,
the limitation of the interest in real property to a life estate, and
indeed the very concept of a fixed share. 160
C. West Virginia Law
1. The Statutory Forced Share
Many states, including West Virginia, currently protect a spouse
against disinheritance by providing the right to a statutorily fixed
share of the decedent's probate estate in lieu of the share provided
in the will. There are two purposes which these forced share statutes
are designed to achieve. The first is to assure -support for the surviving spouse. The second is essentially restitutionary: it is a recognition that marriage is a partnership in which both spouses
contribute to the accumulation of the family assets.' 6'
Neither of these purposes is well served, however, by a statutory
scheme which is easily evaded by depleting the probate estate through
nominal inter vivos transfers. Because most forced share statutes calculate the spouse's share as a fraction of the probate estate, a testator
may substantially reduce the amount that the surviving spouse can
receive by utilizing various will substitutes such as life insurance policies, employee benefit plans, joint and survivor annuities, joint tenancies, joint bank accounts, Totten trusts, P.O.D. accounts, and
62
revocable inter vivos trusts, in order to deplete the probate estate.
158. C. ScIBNER, supra note '147, at 23-58.
159. Kurtz, supra note 145, at 988-999.
160. SHwmm s, SALmON & DAmaN, INHEMrTANCE n; AMEUCA 4 (1987). See, e.g., W. VA. CODE
§§ 42-3-1, 42-2-1, 43-1-1 (1982).

161. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 133, at 307.
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Thus, by failing to take will substitutes into account in the calculation
of the surviving spouse's share, forced share statutes invite attempts
at evasion through the use of these devices.
It should also be noted that failure to consider will substitutes
in the computation of the forced share can cause problems of the
opposite sort: it ignores the fact that spouses often make adequate
provision for each other through the use of various will substitutes. 163
An example derived from Professor Fratcher illustrates this point:
suppose a man has a farm worth $100,000, a son by his first wife
who has helped him work it for years, and a second wife whom he
has designated as the beneficiary of a $200,000 life insurance policy.
If the man leaves the farm by will to his son, under the typical forced
share statute (such as West Virginia's) the widow can keep all of the
life insurance proceeds and also elect to take a forced share of onethird life estate in the farm, 164 notwithstanding the testator's clear
intent and the son's legitimate expectation.
West Virginia protects the surviving spouse from disinheritance
through the use of a forced share statute which provides that if a
spouse renounces the share provided in the will or if no provision
is made in the will for the surviving spouse:
[S]uch surviving wife or husband shall have such share in the real and personal

estate of the decedent as such surviving wife or husband would have taken if the
decedent had died intestate leaving children; otherwise the surviving spouse shall

have no more of the decedent's estate than is given by the will.16'

A spouse who renounces a will, therefore, receives one-third of the
decedent's personalty,es and a statutory dower interest in the realty,
163. Fratcher, supra note 148, at 1058.
164. Id.
165. W. VA. CODE § 42-3-1 (1982).
166. Id. § 42-2-1 (1982):
When any person shall die intestate as to his personal estate or any part thereof, the surplus,
after payment of funeral expenses, charges of administration and debts, shall pass and be
distributed to and among the same persons, and in the same proportions, that real estate

is directed to descend, except as follows:
(a) If the intestate was a married woman, and leave issue surviving, her husband shall be
entitled to one third of such surplus, and if she leave no issue, he shall be entitled to the
whole thereof;
(b) If the intestate leave a widow and issue by the same or a former marriage, the widow shall
be entitled to one third of such surplus, and if he leave no such issue, she shall be entitled
to the whole thereof.
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which is a life estate in one-third of the lands of which the decedent
was seized of an inheritable estate. 167 The dower interest may be either
assigned in kind, 68 or in a lump sum payment. 169
2.

Judicial Intervention
As noted above, a forced share statute such as West Virginia's,
which calculates the surviving spouse's share only from the probate
estate, is ineffective in protecting the spouse from disinheritance.
Thus, the responsibility of balancing the testator's right to control
his property and the need to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance through will substitutes has fallen on the courts. In Davis
v. KB & T Co., 70 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
addressed the validity of a revocable inter vivos trust which allegedly
operated as a fraud upon the surviving spouse's statutory marital
rights. In Davis, the decedent, Mr. Farley, established a revocable
inter vivos trust shortly after his wife suffered a mental breakdown
and he experienced several heart attacks. 7 ' The trust instrument provided that the income from the trust was to be paid to Mr. Farley
during his lifetime, and thereafter to his wife if she needed it, and
upon her death the assets were to be distributed to his relatives as
the couple had no children. 72 Mr. Farley transferred most of his
assets to the trust, about $172,000, leaving a probate estate valued
at only $12,000. 73 Mrs. Davis, on behalf of her incompetent sister,
renounced the will and brought suit to have the trust invalidated. 7 4
After reviewing the various tests mentioned above and noting the
lack of a clear majority test, the court decided that the appropriate
167. Id. § 43-1-1 (1982) provides:
A surviving spouse shall be endowed of one third of all the real estate whereof the deceased

spouse, or any other to his or her use, or in trust for him or her, was, at any time during
the coverture, seised of or entitled to an estate of inheritance, either in possession, reversion,
remainder, or otherwise, unless the right of such surviving spouse to such dower shall have
been lawfully barred or relinquished.
168. Id. § 43-1-12 (1982).
169. Id. § 43-1-20 (1982).
170. 309 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1983).
171. Id. at 47.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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course was "to adopt a flexible standard which takes into account
all of the circumstances and weighs the equities on each side." 175 The
court indicated that some circumstances which might be relevant in
a given case include: "completeness of the transfer, motive of the
transferor, participation by the transferee in alleged fraud on the
surviving spouse, amount of time between the transfer and death,
degree to which the surviving spouse is left without an interest in
the decedent's property or other means of support. 1 1 76 In holding
the trust in Davis valid, the court considered the discretion given to
the trustee in the trust, 177 the decedent's purpose in creating the
and Mr. Farley's role in
trust, 7 8 Mrs. Farley's independent wealth,
179
estate.
wife's
his
of
acquisition
the
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again addressed
the validity of a revocable inter vivos trust in Johnson v. Farmers
& Merchants Bank. 80 Once more the court reviewed the bewildering
array of tests used in other jurisdictions to decide whether an inter
vivos trust is invalid as a fraud upon the marital rights of the surviving spouse and reiterated the test to be used in West Virginia.
Fred Johnson and Dorothy Johnson married in 1963 and while there
were no children of the marriage, Mr. Johnson had two adopted
sons from a previous marriage who were in their early teens at the
time of his marriage to Dorothy.' Mr. Johnson had accumulated
over $1,000,000 in assets comprised mainly of varying degrees of
82
ownership of three closely-held corporations which he managed.
In 1982, Mr. Johnson created a revocable trust containing most of
his assets, appointing the Farmers and Merchants Bank as trustee,
and himself as lifetime beneficiary. 83 Upon Mr. Johnson's death,
the trustee was to place $250,000 into a trust for the benefit of his
175. Id. at 50.
176. Id. at 50 n.3 (quoting Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 12, 106 A.2d 72, 77 (1954)).
177. The court noted that the mere retention of a power of revocation, standing alone, is insufficient to render a trust illusory or testamentary in character. Id. at 51.
178. The court noted that Mr. Farley created the trust in order to provide for himself and his
wife in the event that he became further incapacitated. Id.
179. Id.
180. Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1989).
181. Id.at 754.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 755.
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widow for life, and the remainder in a trust for the benefit of his
sons. 184 The court noted that Mr. Johnson retained the right to manage the trust property without paying the bank any commission and
reserved the stock placed in trust. 85 In fact, the trustee stated to the
court that it had no authority with regard to the three corporations
noted above. 186 In short, Mr. Johnson retained considerable control
over the trust.
Upon his death, Johnson's probate estate was valued at $158,524
while the trust assets were valued at $1,377,039.17 Mrs. Johnson

renounced the will, under which she was entitled to receive personal
property valued at $12,750 and jointly owned assets worth $7,250,
and brought suit to have the inter vivos trust set aside as an illusory
transfer in fraud upon her marital rights.,,
The court in Johnson used the test enunciated in Davis: "a flexible standard which takes into account all of the circumstances and
weighs the equities on each side."'8 9 The court noted that Mrs. Johnson had a very modest estate of her own,'1' and was completely
unaware of the creation of the trust.' 9' More importantly, the court
emphasized the substantial control that Mr. Johnson had retained
in the property and concluded that the inter vivos transfer was illusory. Therefore, the court held that the property should have been
included in his probate estate so that Mrs. Johnson could receive
her fraction. 92
While most people would agree that the results in the Davis and
Johnson cases were equitable, the "balancing the equities" approach
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

760-61.
755.
756.
759 (quoting Davis v. KB & T, 309 S.E.2d 45, 50 (%V.Va. 1983).

190. Id. Mrs. Johnson's estate included an undivided one-half interest in the family residence.
The record indicated that about one year after her husband's death, Mrs. Johnson received a letter
from the Farmers & Merchants Bank informing her that Mr. Johnson's two sons wished to sell their
undivided one-half interest in the home because they felt that the real estate should be producing
income for their benefit. The letter also indicated that if she did not agree to sell the house, she

would be charged a "monthly rental fee of $500 per month, starting with April 1, 1983" (eleven
months prior to the letter). Id. at 759-60 n.10.
191. Id. at 759-60.
192. Id. at 760-62.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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is unsatisfactory. The lack of a standard could easily lead to inconsistent results and does not provide any clear guidance for some-

one who wishes to plan an estate using will substitutes. The better
solution is to adopt a statutory plan which mechanically prevents
the use of will substitutes to cheat the surviving spouse.

D. Revised Uniform Probate Code: Elective Share
1.

History

New York was one of the first separate-property states to provide
a statutory, mechanical solution to the problems presented by will
substitutes, instead of an ad hoc judicial approach. 193 In 1965 the
New York legislature amended the forced share statute by enumerating certain inter vivos transfers 94 which were considered "testamentary substitutes" and thus included in the probate estate for the
calculation of the surviving spouse's forced share. 195
The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code expanded the New
York approach into an "augmented estate" concept. 96 Under the
UPC, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the decedent's
augmented estate. 19
Although the augmented estate concept has been effective in the
states which have enacted it in preventing the use of will substitutes
to reduce the share of the surviving spouse, it has proved somewhat
difficult to apply. 98 In particular, the spousal setoff provision has

193. 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 665, 1 (amending N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18). The New York
legislature noted that the use of judicially sanctioned inter vivos conveyances to deplete the probate

estate had the effect of "reducing the surviving spouse's right of election to absurdity." N.Y. EsT.
PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1-1 (McKinney 1981) (practice commentary).
194. N.Y DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18-1(1)(a)-(e) (1965), treated as testamentary substitutes: (1)
causa mortis gifts; (2) joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety; and (3) "any disposition of
property, in trust or otherwise, as to which the deceased spouse retained, by express provision of the
disposing instrument either alone or in conjunction with another person, a power to revoke the disposition of the assets thereof." Id. § 18-a(l)(e).
195. One year later, the legislature repealed Section 18 and enacted instead Section 5-1.1 which
clarified the statute's purpose and scope. N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
196. UNUORM PROBATE CODE, Article II, Part 2, general comment.
197. U.P.C. § 2-201 (1988).
198. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 133, at 303. See also Kurtz, supra note 145.
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produced problems akin to the tracing problems faced in community
property jurisdictions in trying to decide who owns what and where
it came from.1 9
The "incremental vesting" scheme contained in the RUPC avoids
the tracing problem by using a combined augmented estate which
merges both the decedent's and the surviving spouse's augmented
estates. The combined estate includes the decedent's net probate estate, the decedent's reclaimable or recapturable estate, and the value
of the surviving spouse's estate, including the value of the surviving
spouse's reclaimable estate. Thus, the surviving spouse's share is calculated from the combined augmented estate, but the spouse is
charged with receipt of an appropriate amount of his own augmented
estate. The share to which the surviving spouse is entitled in this
system is one-half of the combined augmented estate, but this share
vests incrementally over time.
The major advantage of this approach is that it accomplishes the
dual purposes of forced share law - support for the surviving spouse
and recognition of the contribution which the spouse made to the
decedent's estate - in a mechanical fashion which does not require
judicial intervention to reach an equitable result. In addition, the
"incremental vesting" system represents a vast improvement over
traditional forced share laws because it is sensitive to the duration
of the marriage in the calculation of the forced share.
2.

Purpose

There are two basic rationales behind the incremental-vesting elective share provided in the RUPC. First, the use of an augmented
estate as the basis for the calculation of the surviving spouse's share
rather than the probate estate is designed to prevent "fraud on the
widow's share." By including the value of "will substitutes" in the
augmented estate, these devices cannot be used to defeat the purpose
of the elective share. Moreover, by preventing this "fraud" mechanically, the uncertainty produced by a judicial "balancing of the
equities" after the fact is avoided. Thus, an individual can use "will

199. Langbein & Waggoner, supra

note 133, at 318.
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substitutes" to plan his or her estate to take maximum advantage
of the benefits of each device and be assured that the outcome is
predictable and will not be upset by later judicial intervention. On
the other hand, individuals who attempt to use these devices in an
improper way will not succeed in defeating the surviving spouse's
elective share.
Second, the incremental vesting concept of the RUPC elective
share is designed to bring elective share law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership. The Editors
of the Joint Editorial Board for the RUPC note that the economic
partnership theory is already applied by the equitable distribution
system when a marriage ends in a divorce, and it is applied in community-property states when a marriage ends in death. The typical
elective share provided in a common-law state, however, implements
this concept very poorly when the marriage ends in death.
3. Calculation
Although the length and detail of the RUPC elective share provisions make them seem complex, in fact a relatively simple (though
detailed) four-step process is required to apply the scheme. First, the
size and composition of the augmented estate is determined based
on § 2-202. Second, the applicable elective-share percentage is obtained from the schedule in § 2-201 according to the length of the
marriage. Third, the value of the elective-share amount is calculated
by applying the elective-share percentage to the augmented estate.
Finally, the satisfaction of the elective share is determined under §
2-207. Under this section, the decedent's net probate and "reclaimable" estates are liable to the satisfaction of the elective-share amount
only to the extent that the elective share amount is not satisfied by
the sum of: (1) amounts that pass or have passed from decedent to
the surviving spouse by testate or intestate succession; (2) amounts
included in the augmented estate under § 2-202(a)(3) (property to
which the surviving spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's
death); (3) amounts which would have passed to the spouse but were
disclaimed; and (4) twice the elective-share percentage, determined
under § 2-201(a), of the survivor's assets.
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a. Augmented Estate
The augmented estate is defined in § 2-202 of the RUPC.M Essentially, the augmented estate is the sum of four elements: the decedent's probate estate, the decedent's "reclaimable" estate, property
shifting to the surviving spouse due to the decedent's death, and the
assets of the surviving spouse, including the spouse's reclaimable estate.
The decedent's probate estate for purposes of the augmented estate is property which would pass by intestate succession if the decedent died without a valid wll,2y1 but does not include funeral and
administration expenses, enforceable claims, homestead allowances
or property exemptions.m
The decedent's "reclaimable" or "recapturable" estate includes:
(1) property subject to a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the decedent; 2°3 (2) the decedent's interest in property held immediately before death by the decedent and another (other
than the surviving spouse) with right of survivorship, or the decedent's interest to the extent that while married to the surviving spouse
the decedent transferred that interest to any person (other than the
surviving spouse) within two years of death;2 4 (3) proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life payable to any person other than the
surviving spouse if the decedent owned the policy, had the power
to change the beneficiary or held (alone) a presently exercisable general power of appointment, or if the decedent transferred the policy
while married to the surviving spouse to another person (other than
the surviving spouse) within two years of death;M5 and (4) property
transferred by the decedent to anyone other than a bona fide purchaser at any time during the decedent's marriage to the surviving
spouse to or for the benefit of any person (other than the surviving
spouse) if the transfer is of a specified type (which generally deal
200. See RUPC § 2-202.
201. Id. § 2-202(f)(1)(iv).

202. Id. § 2-202(a)(1). The surviving spouse's right to homestead, property and family allowances
are in addition to elective-share -and supplemental elective-share amounts. Id. § 2-206.
203. RUPC § 2-202(a)(2)(i).
204. Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(ii).
205. Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(iii).
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with property over which the decedent maintains some degree of
control).2°6
The third element of the augmented estate is the value of property
shifting to the surviving spouse because of the decedent's death, except by testate or intestate succession, homestead allowance or property exemption. 207 Thus, the augmented estate includes the value of
property shifting to the spouse due to rights of survivorship, proceeds
from life insurance on the decedent's life and benefits payable under
a retirement plan in which the decedent was a participant, except
for the Federal Social Security System. 2°8
Finally, the augmented estate includes the value of the surviving
spouse's assets at the decedent's death, including any property which
would have been in the surviving spouse's "reclaimable" estate if
the spouse had predeceased the decedent. 2 9
b. Elective-Share Percentage
The elective-share percentage is provided in § 2-201 .210 As noted
above, the purpose of the incremental vesting system is to mechanically approximate the relative contribution of each spouse to the
assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus, the sliding scale in §
2-201 provides a greater elective-share percentage for a marriage which
has lasted fifteen years than one which has lasted only two years.
Specifically, the schedule in § 2-201 provides for a surviving spouse
whose marriage to the decedent lasted only one year or less to elect
a "supplemental elective-share amount" only. If the marriage lasted
between one and-two years, the applicable elective-share percentage
is 3% of the augmented estate. The elective-share percentage which
the surviving spouse is entitled to increases with each year of marriage
until it reaches the maximum 50% after fifteen years of marriage.
Thus, to determine the elective share which a surviving spouse is
206.
207.
208.
209.

rd. § 2-202(a)(2)(iv).
These allowances are in addition to the elective-share amount. See supra note 201.
RUPC § 2-202(a)3).
Id. § 2-202(a)(4).

210. See id. § 2-201.
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entitled to, the length of the marriage is used to select the appropriate
percentage from the schedule in § 2-201.
c.

Elective-Share Amount

The elective-share amount is calculated by applying the electiveshare percentage obtained from the schedule in § 2-201 to the augmented estate as defined in § 2-202. The resulting elective-share
amount is the amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled. Because an elective share statute is designed to provide support for the
surviving spouse as well as to recognize the partnership aspect of
marriage, § 2-201(b) provides for a "supplemental elective share
amount" if the elective share amount is less than $50,000.211
d.

Satisfaction of the Elective-Share Amount

Section 2-207 determines the order in which assets are applied to
satisfy the elective-share amount. 212 Under this section, the decedent's
probate and "reclaimable" estates are liable to satisfy the electiveshare amount only to the extent that it is not satisfied by: (1) amounts
that pass or have passed from the decedent to the surviving spouse
by testate or intestate succession, (2) amounts included in the augmented estate under § 2-202(a)(3) (property to which the surviving
spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death), (3) amounts which
would have passed to the spouse but were disclaimed, and (4) twice
the elective-share percentage, determined under § 2-201(a), of the
survivor's assets. 21 3 If the combined value of these amounts equals
or exceeds the elective-share amount, then the surviving spouse is
not entitled to share any further in the decedent's estate, unless the
surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective share amount
under § 2-201(b).
The first three sources of satisfaction for the elective-share amount
are relatively self-explanatory, but the fourth may not be quite as
obvious. As noted above, the purpose of the incremental-vesting

211. See id. § 2-201(b).
212. RUPC § 2-207.
213. See id.
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scheme is to implement the partnership concept of marriage. That
is, the purpose is to mechanically approximate the percentage of a
couple's total assets which are "fruits of the marriage." The incremental-vesting system avoids the "tracing-to-source" problem 14 by
applying an ever-increasing percentage to the couple's assets without
regard to how they were derived rather than a flat 50% to an everincreasing level of the couple's assets. Thus, if a marriage has lasted
ten years and the applicable elective-share percentage is 30%, the
incremental vesting system equates 30% of the couple's combined
assets with 50% of the assets which were acquired during the marriage. This implies, of course, that 6000 of the couple's combined
assets are assets which were acquired during the marriage. The assets
of each party are governed by the same ratio that applies to the
couple's combined assets. Thus, each party is treated as if 60% of
their individual total assets are actually marital property. Therefore,
to determine how much of the surviving spouse's assets are in fact
marital property and thus must be set off against the elective-share
amount, double the elective percentage contained in the schedule in
§ 2-201 (which is based on 500%0 of the total assets) is used.
If the four sources of satisfaction mentioned above are less than
the applicable elective-share amount, then the surviving spouse is
entitled to satisfaction from the decedent's estate. According to § 2207(b), amounts included in the decedent's probate estate and the
portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate other than property
transferred irrevocably two years before the decedent's death are applied first to satisfy the surviving spouse's elective share. These sources
are applied so that the burden of satisfaction is equitably apportioned
among the beneficiaries of the estate in proportion to their interests
in it. If the elective-share amount is still unsatisfied, then § 2-207
provides for the application of property which was transferred within

214. "Tracing-to-source" is a problem encountered in community property states when a mar-

riage ends, either in divorce or death. The problem arises because the American community property
states are "community of acquest" jurisdictions rather than "universal community" states. Under a
"community of acquest" system, the only property which is "community" property is property which
was obtained during the marriage. Property which was obtained by the parties prior to the marriage,

and generally the profits from that property, remain the separate property of each party. Thus,
determining the source of property becomes important in deciding whether it is separate or community

property. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 133.
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two years of the decedent's death to non bona fide purchasers. Section 2-207 also provides that only original recipients of the reclaimable estate and their donees are liable to make a contribution toward
the surviving spouse's elective-share amount. Further, it provides that
a person liable to make contribution may choose to give up the
proportional part of the reclaimable estate, or may pay the value
for which he is liable. '5
4. Other Provisions of the Revised Uniform Probate Code,
Part 2
As noted above, § 2-201(b) provides for a "supplemental electiveshafe amount" if the calculated 'lective-share amount is less than
$50,000. In satisfying this $50,000, the surviving spouse's assets count
first, including amounts shifting to the surviving spouse at the decedent's death, and amounts owing to the survivor under the calculated elective-share amount. However, amounts going to the
surviving spouse under homestead allowances, property exemptions,
and the survivor's Social Security and other governmental benefits
are excluded from satisfaction of the "supplemental elective-share
amount. 2 1- 6 If the survivor's assets are less than $50,000, then the
survivor is entitled to whatever portion of the decedent's estate is
necessary to satisfy the minimum, up to 100% of the decedent's
estate.
Section 2-202(d) provides protection for payors who make payments to beneficiaries before receipt of notification from the surviving spouse of intent to file a petition for an elective share. Payment
made before receipt of such notice discharges the payor, but not the
217
recipient, from all claims for the amounts so paid.
Section 2-203 states that the right of election may only be exercised by a surviving spouse during his or her lifetime. This section
also provides procedures for election by an incapacitated surviving
spouse.

21

215. RUPC § 2-207.
216. See supra note 201.
217. RUPC § 2-202(d).
218. Id. 2-203.
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Under § 2-204, the right of election of a surviving spouse may
be waived wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written
agreement signed by the surviving spouse. 21 9 Thus, if the requirements
of this provision are met, both pre- and post-nuptial agreements are
valid.
The procedure and time limit for exercising the right of election
are provided in § 2-205. The surviving spouse must file a petition
for the elective share within nine months of probate of the decedent's
will. This time may be extended if the surviving spouse petitions for
extra time within nine months of the decedent's deathYm
V.

CONCLUSION

The West Virginia Law Institute should be commended for identifying the areas of intestate succession and elective share as deserving
of careful study and legislative attention. As noted above, over onehalf of all people die intestate. Unquestionably, any subject matter
which involves all of the worldly possessions of one-half of the people
deserves the careful consideration of the legislature. Since our current
statutes do not reflect the "average" citizen's desires, they should
be revised and the RUPC provides a well-reasoned alternative.
While the number of families affected by the elective share statute
is significantly less than those affected by intestate succession, the
reasons for revising the current law are no less compelling. The policy
justification for limiting a decedent's freedom of testation is to protect a surviving spouse and is based in fairness and equity. If the
current statute falls short of achieving fairness and equity, then it
should be revised.
Our court in Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank has clearly
signaled that a blind adherence to a literal reading of the current
statute will no longer suffice. Under certain circumstances, the probate estate will be augmented by other assets to achieve "fairness."
Our court has determined that "equitable" results are more important than simplicity of application. However, the legacy of the John219. Id. § 2-204.
220. Id. § 2-205
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son decision is that neither clients nor their attorneys can anticipate
what "fairness and equity" will mean at some undetermined time
in the future under unknown circumstances. In such a situation, rational estate planning becomes difficult, if not impossible. The RUPC
provides a reasonable and responsible solution which is consistent
with the judicially endorsed policies of equitable distribution and the
fairness sought in Johnson. Perhaps most important, the uncertainty
inherent in the case by case approach of Johnson is replaced by
understandable and predictable rules capable of administration without active judicial intervention.
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Appendix
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
ARTICLE H - INTESTACY, WILLS,
AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS*
Section
1-201
2-101
2-102
2-103
2-104
2-105
2-106
2-107
2-108
2-109
2-110
2-111
2-112
2-113
2-114
2-201
2-202
2-203
2-204
2-205

*

General Definitions
Intestate Estate
Share of Spouse
Share of Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouse
Requirement That Heir Survive Decedent for
120 Hours
No Taker
Representation
Kindred of Half Blood
Afterborn Heirs
Advancements
Debts To Decedents
Alienage
Dower and Curtesy Abolished
Individuals Related To Decedent
Meaning of Child and Related Terms
Right To Elective Share
Augmented Estate
Right of Election Personal To Surviving
Spouse
Waiver of Right To Elect and of Other
Rights
Proceeding for Elective Share; Time Limit

The following text, approved and recommended for enactment in all the states by the

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is subject to revision by the Style
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Final copies of
the Act with style changes and complete Prefatory Note and Comments can be obtained for a nominal
charge from the Headquarters Office of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws after November 1, 1990: 676 North St. Clair Street, Suite 1700, Chicago, IL 60611, 312/9150195.
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2-206
2-207

2-301
2-302

[Vol. 93

Effect of Election on Statutory Benefits
Charging Spouse With Owned Assets And
Gifts Received; Liability Of Others For
Balance Of Elective Share
Entitlement Of Spouse; Premarital Will
Omitted Children

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3

58

Fisher and Curnutte: Reforming the Law of Interstate Succession and Elective Shares: N
1990]

INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND ELECTIVE SHARES

SECTION 1-201.

GENERAL DEFIFNITIONS.

Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles that are applicable to specific Articles, parts, or sections, and
unless the context otherwise requires, in this Code:
(1) "Agent" includes an attorney-in-fact under a durable or nondurable power of attorney, an individual authorized to make decisions concerning another's health care, and an individual authorized
to make decisions for another under a natural death act.
(2) "Application" means a written request to the Registrar for
an order of informal probate or appointment under Part 3 of Article
III.
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to a trust beneficiary, includes a
person who has any present or future interest, vested or contingent,
and also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other
transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled
to enforce the trust; as it relates to a beneficiary of a beneficiary
designation, refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy,
of an account with POD designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit sharing, retirement, or
similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death; and, as
it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument"
includes a grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, a donee, appointee, or taker
in default of a power of appointment, or a person in whose favor
a power of attorney or a power held in any individual, fiduciary,
or representative capacity is exercised.
(4) "Beneficiary designation" refers to a governing instrument
naming a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account
with POD designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form
(TOD), or of a pension, profit- sharing, retirement, or similar benefit
plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death.
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child
under this Code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant.
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(6) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected
persons, includes liabilities of the decedent or protected person whether
arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the estate
which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and expenses
of administration. The term does not include estate or inheritance
taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific assets alleged to be included in the estate.
(7) "Courts" means the Court or branch having jurisdiction in
matters relating to the affairs of decedents. This Court in this State
].
is known as [..........
(8) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a Court
to manage the estate of a protected person.
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all his [or her] descendants of all generations, with the relationship of parent and child
at each generation being determined by the definition of child and
parent contained in this Code.
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property and, when used as a verb, means
to dispose of real or personal property by will.
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive
a devise. In the case of a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or
to a trustee on trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the
devisee and the beneficiaries are not devisees.
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described
in Section 5-401.
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property
of a decedent from his [or her] personal representative other than
as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee
only to the extent of distributed assets or increment thereto remaining
in his [or her] hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to whom
the trustee has distributed property received from a personal representative is a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this provision, "testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to
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whom assets are transferred by will, to the extent of the devised
assets.
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or
other person whose affairs are subject to this Code as originally
constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration.
(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is described in Section 2-403.
(16) "Fiduciary" includes personal representative, guardian, conservator, and trustee.
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of another jurisdiction.
(18) "Formal proceedings" means those conducted before a judge
with notice to interested persons.
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance
or annuity policy, account with POD designation, security registered
in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or
similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of
appointment or a power of attorney, or a donative, appointive, or
nominative instrument of any other type.
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian
of a minor or incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court
appointment, but excludes one who is merely a guardian ad litem.
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 2-711, means those
persons, including the surviving spouse and the state, who are entitled
under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a decedent.
(22) "Incapacitated person" is as defined in Section 5-103.
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to interested persons by an officer of the Court acting as a
registrar for probate of a will or appointment of a personal representative.
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses,
creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
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claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or
protected person. It also includes persons having priority for appointment as personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it relates to particular
persons may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any
-proceeding.
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in subsection (9).
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property with the right of survivorship" includes co-owners
of property held under circumstances that entitle one or more to the
whole of the property on the death of the other or others, but excludes forms of co-ownership registration in which the underlying
ownership of each party is in proportion to that party's contribution.
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease.
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of administration, and letters of conservatorship.
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under [21] years of age.
(30) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which property is encumbered or used as security.
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in another jurisdiction at the time of his [or her] death.
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common
interest, or any other legal entity.
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would
be entitled to take if the child died without a will, as a parent under
this Code by intestate succession from the child whose relationship
is in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent,
foster parent, or grandparent.
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer,
government, governmental agency or subdivision, or any other per-
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son authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument to
make payments.
(35) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, an organization, or other legal entity.
(36) "Personal representative" includes executor, administrator,
successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons
who perform substantially the same function under the law governing
their status. "General personal representative" excludes special administrator.
(37) "Petition" means a written request to the Court for an order
after notice.
(38) "Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity.
(39) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any
interest therein and means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(40) "Protected person" is as defined in Section 5-103.
(41) "Protective proceeding" is as defined in Section 5-103.
(42) "Registrar" refers to the official of the Court designated to
perform the functions of Registrar as provided in Section 1-307.
(43) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out
of production under such a title or lease, collateral trust certificate,
transferable share, voting trust certificate or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of
interest or participation, any temporary or interim certificate, receipt,
or certificate of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing.
(44) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes
the full process of administration, distribution, and closing.
(45) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as
described by Sections 3-614 through 3-618.
(46) "State" includes any state of the United States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory
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or possession subject to the legislative authority of the United States.
(47) "Successor personal representative" means a personal representative, other than a special administrator, who is appointed to
succeed a previously appointed personal representative.
(48) "Successors" means those persons, other than creditors, who
are entitled to property of a decedent under his [or her] will or this
Code.
(49) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings described in Article III, Part 5.
- (50) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will
or determine intestacy.
(51) "Testator" includes the female as well as the male.
(52) "Trust" includes any express trust, private or charitable, with
additions thereto, wherever and however created. It also includes a
trust created or determined by judgment or decree under which the
trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. "Trust"
excludes other constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting trusts,
conservatorships, personal representatives, trust accounts as defined
in Article VI, custodial arrangements pursuant to [each state should
list its legislation, including that relating to [gifts] [transfers] to minors, dealing with special custodial situations], business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common trust
funds, voting trusts, security arrangements liquidation trusts, and
trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest,
salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any kind,
and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee
for another.
(53) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by court.
(54) "Ward" is as defined in Section 5-103.
(55) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument that
merely appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of an
individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing
by intestate succession.
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[FOR ADOPTION IN COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES]
[(56) "Separate property" (if necessary, to be defined locally in
accordance with existing concept in adopting state).
(57) "Community property" (if necessary, to be defined locally
in accordance with existing concept in adopting state).]
Part 1
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SECTION 2101.

INTESTATE ESTATE.

(a) Any part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by
will passes by intestate succession to the decedent's heirs as prescribed
in this Code, except as modified by the decedent's will.
(b) A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right
of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that
class survives the decedent, the share of the decedent's intestate to
which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that
individual or each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her]
intestate share.
SECTION 2-102.

SHARE OF SPOUSE.

The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant
of the surviving spouse who survives the decedent;
(2) the first [$200,000], plus three-fourths of any balance of the
intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(3) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also
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descendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one
or more surviving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent;
(4) the first [$100,000], plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants
are not descendants of the surviving spouse.
[ALTERNATIVE PROVISION FOR COMMUNITY PROPERTY
STATES]
[SECTION 2-102A.

SHARE OF SPOUSE.

(a) The intestate share of a surviving spouse in separate property
is:
(1) the entire intestate estate if:
(i) no descendant or parent of the decedent survives the
decedent; or
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant
of the surviving spouse who survives the decedent;
(2) the first [$200,000], plus three-fourths of any balance of
the intestate estate, if no descendant of the decedent survives the
decedent but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent;
(3) the first [$150,000], plus one-half of any balance of the
intestate estate, if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also
descendants of the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse has one
or more surviving descendants who are not descendants of the decedent;
(4) the first [$100,000], plus one-half of any balance of the
intestate estate, if one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.
(b) The one-half of community property belonging to the decedent passes to the [surviving spouse] as the intestate share.]
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SHARE OF HEIRS OTHER THAN
SURVIVING SPOUSE.

Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's
surviving spouse under Section 2-102, or the entire intestate estate
if there is no suriving spouse, passes in the following order to the
individuals designated below who survive the decedent:
(1) to the decedent's descendants by representation;
(2) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents
equally if both survive, or to the surviving parent;
(3) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the decedent's parents or either of them by representation;
(4) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of
a parent, but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents
or descendants of grandparents, half of the estate passes to the decedent's paternal grandparents equally if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the descendants of the decedent's
paternal grandparents or either of them if both are deceased, the
descendants taking by representation; and the other half passes to
the decedent's maternal relatives in the same manner; but if there
is no surviving grandparent or descendant of a grandparent on either
the paternal or the maternal side, the entire estate passes to the decedent's relatives on the other side in the same manner as the half.
SECTION 2-104.

REQUIREMENT THAT HEIR SURVIVE.

Any individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours
is deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property, and intestate succession, and the
decedent's heirs are determined accordingly. If the time of death of
the decedent or of the individual who would otherwise be an heir,
or the times of death of both, cannot be determined, and it is not
established that the individual who would otherwise be an heir survived the decedent by hours, it is deemed that the individual failed
to survive for the required period. This section is not to be applied
if its application would result in a taking of intestate estate by the
state under Section 2-105.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990

67

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

SECTION 2-105.

[Vol. 93

NO TAKER.

If there is no taker under the provisions of this Article, the intestate estate passes to the [state].
SECTION 2-106.

REPRESENTATION.

(a) If, under Section 2-103(1), a decedent's intestate estate or a
part thereof passes "by representation" to the decedent's descendants, the estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares
as there are (i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest to the
decedent that contains one or more descendants who survive the decedent and (ii) then-deceased descendants in the same generation who
left descendants then living, if any. Each then-living descendant in
that nearest generation is allocated one share. The remaining shares,
if any, are combined and then divided in the same manner among
the then- living descendants of the then-deceased descendants as if
the descendants already allocated a share and their descendants had
predeceased the decedent.
(b) If, under Section 2-103(3) or (4), a decedent's intestate estate
or a part thereof passes "by representation" to the descendants of
the decedent's deceased parents or either of them.or to the descendants of the decedent's deceased paternal or maternal grandparents
or either of them, the estate or part thereof is divided into as many
equal shares as there are (i) surviving descendants in the generation
nearest to the deceased parents or either of them or the deceased
grandparents or either of them that contains one or more descendants
who survive the decedent and (i) then-deceased descendants in the
same generation who left descendants then living, if any. Each thenliving descendant in that nearest generation is allocated one share.
The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the
same manner among the then-living descendants of the then-deceased
descendants as if the descendants already allocated a share and their
descendants had predeceased the decedent.
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SECTION 2-107.

KINDRED OF HALF BLOOD.

Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would
inherit if they were of the whole blood.
SECTION 2-108.

AFTERBORN HEIRS.

An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living
at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.
SECTION 2-109.

ADVANCEMENTS.

(a) If an individual dies intestate as to all or a portion of his [or
her] estate, property the decedent gave during the decedent's lifetime
to an individual who, at the decedent's death, is an heir is treated
as an advancement against the heir's intestate share only if the decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing or the heir acknowledged in writing that the gift is an advancement or if the decedent's
contemporaneous writing or the heir's written acknowledgment otherwise indicates that the gift is to be taken into account in computing
the division and distribution of the decedent's intestate estate.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), property advanced is valued
as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the
property or as of the time of the decedent's death, whichever first
occurs.
(c) If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent,
the property is not taken into account in computing the division and
distribution of the decedent's intestate estate, unless the decedent's
contemporaneous writing provides otherwise.
SECTION 2-110.

DEBTS TO DECEDENT.

A debt owed to the decedent is not charged against the intestate
share of any individual except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the decedent, the debt is not taken into account in computing
the intestate share of the debtor's descendants.
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ALIENAGE.

No individual is disqualified to take as an heir because the individual or an individual through whom he [or she] claims is or has
been an alien.
[SECTION 2-112.

DOWER AND CURTESY ABOLISHED.
The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished.]

SECTION 2-113.

INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO DECEDENT
THROUGH TWO LINES.
An individual who is related to the decedent through two lines
of relationship is entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that would entitle the individual to the larger share.
SECTION 2-114.

MEANING OF CHILD AND RELATED
TERMS.
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent
and child must be established to determine succession by, through,
or from a person,
(1) except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual is the child
of his [or her] natural parents, regardless of their marital status. The
parent and child relationship may be established under the [Uniform
Parentage Act].
[Alternative Subjection (1) For States That Have Not Adopted The
Uniform Parentage Act
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual born of
parents not married to each other is a child of the mother and father.
Paternity is established [under applicable state law] [insert appropriate statutory reference].]
(2) an adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting
parent or parents and not of his [or her] natural parents, except that
adoption of a child by the spouse of either natural parent has no 70
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effect on (i) the relationship between the child and that natural parent
or (ii) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit
from or through the other natural parent.
(3) Inheritance from or through the child by either natural parent
or his [or her] kindred is precluded unless that natural parent has
openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not refused to
support the child.
Part 2
ELECTIVE SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE
SECTION 2-201. RIGHT TO ELECTIVE SHARE.
(a) Elective-Share Amount. The surviving spouse of a decedent
who dies domiciled in this State has a right of election, under the
limitations and conditions stated in this part, to take an electiveshare amount equal to the value of the elective-share percentage of
the augmented estate, determined by the length of time the spouse
and the decedent were married to each other, in accordance with the
following schedule:

The elective-share percentIf the decedent and the
age is:
spouse were married to each
other:
Less than 1 year ............. .............. Supplemental Amount Only.
1 year but less than 2 years .......... 3% of the augmented estate.
2 years but less than 3 years .......... 6% of the augmented estate.
3 years but less than 4 years .......... 9% of the augmented estate.
4 years but less than 5 years ......... 12% of the augmented estate.
5 years but less than 6 years ......... 15% of the augmented estate.
6 years but less than 7 years ......... 18% of the augmented estate.
7 years but less than 8 years ......... 21% of the augmented estate.
8 years but less than 9 years ......... 2400 of the augmented estate.
9 years but less than 10 years ....... 27% of the augmented estate.
10 years but less than 11 years ...... 30% of the augmented estate.
11 years but less than 12 years ...... 34% of the augmented estate.
12 years but less than 13 years ...... 38% of the augmented estate.
13 years but less than 14 years ...... 42% of the augmented estate.
14 years but less than 15 years ...... 46% of the augmented estate.
50% of the augmented estate. 71
........................
15 yearsbyorThemore
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(b) Supplemental Elective-Share Amount. If the sum of the
amounts described in Sections 2-202(a)(3) and (4), 2-207(a)(1) and
(3), and that part of the elective-share amount payable from the
decedent's probate and reclaimable estates under Sections 2-207(b)
and (c) is less than [$50,000], the surviving spouse is entitled to a
supplemental elective-share amount equal to [$50,000] minus the sum
of the amounts described in those sections. The supplemental electiveshare amount is payable from the decedent's probate estate and from
recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate in the order of priority
set forth in Sections 2-207(b) and (c).
(c) Non-Domiciliary. The right, if any, of the surviving spouse
of a decedent who dies domiciled outside this State to take an elective
share in property in this State is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.
SECTION 2-202. AUGMENTED ESTATE.
(a) Property Included in the Augmented Estate. The augmented
estate means the sum of:
(1) The value of the decedent's probate estate, reduced by
funeral and administration expenses,homestead allowance, family allowances and exemptions,and enforceable claims;
(2) The value of the decedent's reclaimable estate. The decedent's reclaimable estate is composed of all property, whether real
or personal, movable or immovable, wherever situated, not included
in the decedent's probate estate, of any of the following types:
(i) Property to the extent the passing of the principal thereof
to or for the benefit of any person (other than the decedent's surviving spouse) was subject to a presently exercisable general power
of appointment held by the decedent alone, if the decedent held that
power immediately before his [or her] death or if and to the extent
the decedent, while married to his [or her] surviving spouse and during the two-year period preceding the decedent's death, released that
power or exercised that power in favor of any person other than the
decedent or the decedent's estate, spouse, or surviving spouse;
(ii) Property, to the extent of the decedent's unilaterally
severable interest therein, held by the decedent and any other person 72
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(other than the decedent's surviving spouse) with right of survivorship, if the decedent held that interest immediately before his [or
her] death or if and to the extent the decedent, while married to his
[or her] surviving spouse and during the two-year period preceding
the decedent's death, transferred that interest to any person other
than the decedent's surviving spouse;
(iii) Proceeds of insurance (including accidental death benefits) on the life of the decedent payable to any person other than
the decedent's surviving spouse, if the decedent owned the insurance
policy, had the power to change the beneficiary of the insurance
policy, or the insurance policy was subject to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment held by the decedent alone immediately before his [or her] death or if and to the extent the decedent,
while married to his [or her] surviving spouse and ;during the twoyear period preceding the decedent's death, transferred that policy
to any person other than the decedent's surviving spouse; and
(iv) Property transferred by the decedent to any person
other than a bona fide purchaser at any time during the decedent's
marriage to the surviving spouse, to or for the benefit of any person
(other than the decedent's surviving spouse), if the transfer is of any
of the following types:
(A) Any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time of or during the two-year period preceding his [or
her] death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from,
the property;
(B) Any transfer to the extent that, at the time of or
during the two-year period preceding the decedent's death, the income or principal was subject to a power, exercisable by the decedent
alone or in conjunction with any other person or exercisable by a
nonadverse party, for the benefit of the decedent or the decedent's
estate;
(C) Any transfer of property, to the extent the decedent's contribution to it, as a percentage of the whole, was made
within two years before the decedent's death, by which the property
is held at the time of or during the two-year period preceding the
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decedent's death by the decedent and another (other than the decedent's surviving spouse) with right of survivorship;
(D) Any transfer made to a donee within two years
before the decedent's death to the extent that the aggregate transfers
to any one donee in either of the years exceed $10,000.00.
(3) The value of property to which the surviving 'spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death (other than by homestead
allowance, exempt property allowance, family allowance, testate succession, or intestate succession), including the proceeds of insurance
(including accidental death benefits) on the life of the decedent and
benefits payable under a retirement plan in which the decedent was
a participant, exclusive of the Federal Social Security system; and
(4) The value of property owned by the surviving spouse at
the decedent's death, reduced by enforceable claims against that
property or that spouse, plus the value of amounts that would have
been includible in the spouse's reclaimable estate if the surviving
spouse had predeceased the decedent.
(b) Exclusions. Any transfer or exercise or release of a power of
appointment is excluded from the decedent's reclaimable estate: (i)
to the extent the decedent received adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth for the transfer, exercise, or release; or
(ii) if irrevocably made with the written consent or joinder of the
surviving spouse.
(c) Valuation. Property is valued as of the decedent's death, but
property irrevocably transferred during the two-year period preceding
the decedent's death that is included in the decedent's reclaimable
estate under subsection (a)(2)(i), (ii), and (iv) is valued at the time
of the transfer. If the terms of more than one of the subparagraphs
or sub-subparagraphs of subsection (a)(2) apply, the property is included in the augmented estate under the subparagraph or sub-subparagraph that yields the highest value. For purposes of this
subsection, an irrevocable transfer of property includes an irrevocable
exercise or release of a power of appointment.
(d) Protection of Payors and Other Third Parties.
(1) Although under this section a payment, item of property,
or
other
benefit is included in the decedent's reclaimable estate, a 74
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3

Fisher and Curnutte: Reforming the Law of Interstate Succession and Elective Shares: N
1990]

INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND ELECTIVE SHARES

payor or other third party is not liable for having made a payment
or transferred an item of property or other benefit to a beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument, or for having taken any other
action in good faith reliance on the validity of a governing instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of the decedent's death,
before the payor or other third party received written notice from
the surviving spouse or spouse's representative of an intention to file
a petition for the elective share or that a petition for the elective
share has been filed. The protection from liability does not extend
to payments made or other actions taken after the payor or other
third party received written notice of an intention to file a petition
for the elective share or that a petition for the elective share has
been filed.
(2) The written notice of intention to file a petition for the
elective share or that a petition for the elective share has been filed
must be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or
home by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or
served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as
a summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of intention to file a petition for the elective share or that a petition for
the elective share has been filed, a payor or other third party may
pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item of property
held by it to or with the Court having jurisdiction of the probate
proceedings relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings
have been commenced, to or with the Court having jurisdiction of
probate proceedings relating to decedents' estates located in the county
of the decedent's residence. The Court shall hold the funds or item
of property and, upon its determination under Section 2-205(d), shall
order disbursement in accordance with the determination. If no petition is filed in the Court within the specified time under Section
2-205(a), or if filed, the demand for an elective share is withdrawn
under Section 2-205(c), the Court shall order disbursement to the
designated beneficiary. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or
with the Court discharge the payor or other third party from all
claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the Court.
(3) Upon petition to the Probate Court by the beneficiary
designated in a governing instrument, the Court may order that all 75
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or part of the property be paid to the beneficiary in an amount and
subject to conditions consistent with this section.
(e) Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers; Personal Liability of Recipient.
(1) No person who purchases property from a recipient for
value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item
of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable
obligation, is obligated under this Part to return that payment, item
of property, or benefit or is liable under this Part for the amount
of that payment or the value of that item of property or benefit.
But a person who, not for value, received a payment, item of property, or any other benefit included in the decedent's reclaimable estate
is obligated to return that payment, item of property, or benefit, or
is personally liable for the amount of that payment or the value of
that item of property or benefit, as provided in Section 2-207.
(2) If any section or part of any section of this Part is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit included in the decedent's reclaimable estate,
a person who, not for value, received that payment, item of property,
or any other benefit is obligated to return that payment, item of
property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of that
payment or the value of that item of property or benefit, as provided
in Section 2-207, to the person who would have been entitled to it
were that section or part of that section not preempted.
(f) Definitions.
(1) For purposes of this section:
(i) a "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in
good faith and without notice of any adverse claim. Any recorded
instrument on which a state documentary fee is noted pursuant to
[insert appropriate reference] is prima facie evidence that the transfer
described therein was made to a bona fide purchaser.
(ii) a "nonadverse party" is a person who does not have
a substantial beneficial interest in the trust or other property arrangement that would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power that he [or she] possesses respecting the trust
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or other property arrangement. A person having a general power of
appointment over property is deemed to have a beneficial interest in
the property.
(iii) a "presently exercisable general power of appointment" is a power of appointment under which, at the time in question, the decedent by an exercise of the power could have created
an interest, present or future, in himself [or herself] or his [or her]
creditors.
(iv) "probate estate" is property, whether real or personal,
movable or immovable, wherever situated, that would pass by intestate succession if the decedent died without a valid will.
(2) For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(iii) and (iv), a "transfer" includes an exercise or release of a power of appointment, but
does not include a lapse of a power of appointment.
(3) For purposes of subsections (a)(3) and (4), the "value of
property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death" and
the "value of property to which the surviving spouse succeeds by
reason of the decedent's death" includes the commuted value of any
present or future interest then held by the surviving spouse and the
commuted value of amounts payable to the surviving spouse after
the decedent's death, under any trust, life insurance settlement option, annuity contract, public or private pension, disability compensation, death benefit or retirement plan, or any similar arrangement,
exclusive of the Federal Social Security system.

SECTION 2-203.

RIGHT OF ELECTION PERSONAL TO
SURVIVING SPOUSE.

(a) Surviving Spouse Must Be Living at Time of Election. The
right of election by a surviving spouse who is living when the petition
for the elective share is filed in the Court under Section 2-205(a).
If the election is not exercised by the surviving spouse personally,
it may be exercised on the surviving spouse's behalf by his [or her]
conservator, guardian, or agent under the authority of a power of
attorney.
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(b) Incapacitated Surviving Spouse. If the election is exercised on
behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, that
portion of the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts
due from the decedent's probate estate and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate under Sections 2-207(b) and (c) must be
placed in a custodial trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse
under the provisions of the [Enacting state] Uniform Custodial Trust
Act, except as modified below. For purposes of this subsection, an
election on behalf of a surviving spouse by an agent under a durable
power of attorney is presumed to be on behalf of a surviving spouse
who is an incapacitated person. For purposes of the custodial trust
established by this subsection, (i) the electing guardian, conservator,
or agent is the custodial trustee; (ii) the surviving spouse is the beneficiary; (iii) the custodial trust is deemed to have been created by
the decedent spouse by written transfer that takes effect at the decedent spouse's death and that directs the custodial trustee to administer the custodial trust as for an incapacitated beneficiary; and
(iv) the [Enacting state] Uniform Custodial Trust Act is modified as
follows:
(1) The first sentence of [Section 2(e)] is replaced by the following sentence: "Neither an incapacitated beneficiary nor anyone
acting on behalf of an incapacitated beneficiary has a power to terminate the custodial trust; but if the beneficiary regains capacity,
the beneficiary then acquires the power to terminate the custodial
trust by delivering to the custodial trustee a writing signed by the
beneficiary declaring the termination.
(2) [Section 6(b)] is deleted.
(3) The last sentence of [Section 9(b)] is replaced by the following sentence: "Expenditures may be made in the manner, when,
and to the extent that the custodial trustee determines suitable and
proper, without court order but with regard to other support, income, and property of the beneficiary [exclusive of] [and] benefits
of medical or other forms of assistance from any state or federal
government or governmental agency for which the beneficiary must
qualify on the basis of need."
(4) [Section 17(a)(3)] is replaced by the following provision:
"(3)
upon
the beneficiary's death, the remaining custodial trust prop- 78
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erty, in the following order: (i) under the residuary clause, if any,
of the will of the beneficiary's predeceased spouse against whom the
elective share was taken, as if that predeceased spouse died immediately after the beneficiary; or (ii) to that predeceased spouse's heirs"
under Section' 2-711 of [this State's] Uniform Probate Code.
[ALTERNATIVE SUBSECTION (B) FOR STATES THAT HAVE
NOT ADOPTED
THE UNIFORM CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT]
[(b) Incapacitated Surviving Spouse. If the election is exercised
on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, the
Court must set aside that portion of the elective- share and supplemental elective-share amounts due from the decedent's probate estate
and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable estate under Sections 2207(b) and (c) and must appoint a trustee to administer that property
for the support of the surviving spouse. For purposes of this subsection, an election on behalf of a surviving spouse by an agent under
a durable power of attorney is presumed to be on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person. The trustee must administer the trust in accordance with the following terms and such
additional terms as the Court determines appropriate:
(1) Expenditures of income and principal may be made in the
manner, when, and to the extent that the trustee determines suitable
and proper for the surviving spouse's support, without court order
but with regard to other support, income, and property of the surviving spouse [exclusive of] [and] benefits of medical or other forms
of assistance from any state or federal government or governmental
agency for which the surviving spouse must qualify on the basis of
need.
(2) During the surviving spouse's incapacity, neither the surviving spouse nor anyone acting on behalf of the surviving spouse
has a power to terminate the trust; but if the surviving spouse regains
capacity, the surviving spouse then acquires the power to terminate
the trust and acquire full ownership of the trust property free of
trust, by delivering to the trustee a writing signed by the surviving
spouse declaring the termination.
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(3) Upon the surviving spouse's death, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property in the following order: (i) under
the residuary clause, if any, of the will of the predeceased spouse
against whom the elective share was taken, as if that predeceased
spouse died immediately after the surviving spouse; or (ii) to that
predeceased spouse's heirs under Section 2-711.]
SECTION 2-204.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO ELECT AND OF
OTHER RIGHTS.

(a) The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of
the surviving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or
waiver signed by the surviving spouse.
(b) A surviving spouse's waiver is not enforceable if the surviving
spouse proves that:
(1) he [or she] did not execute the waiver voluntarily; or
(2) the waiver was unconscionable when it was executed and,
before execution of the waiver, he [or she]:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of
the property or financial obligations of the decedent;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any
right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the
decedent beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
decedent.
(c) An issue of unconscionability of a waiver shall be decided as
a matter of law.
(d) Unless it provides to the contrary, a waiver of "all rights"
(or equivalent language) in the property or estate of a present or
prospective spouse or a complete property settlement entered into
after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is a waiver of all

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3

80

Fisher and Curnutte: Reforming the Law of Interstate Succession and Elective Shares: N
1990]

INTESTATE SUCCESSION AND ELECTIVE SHARES

fights of elective share, homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance by each spouse in the property of the other and
a renunciation by each of all benefits that would otherwise pass to
him [or her] from the other by intestate succession or by virtue of
the provisions of any will executed before the waiver or property
settlement.

SECTION 2-205.

PROCEEDINGS FOR ELECTIVE SHARE;
TIME LIMIT.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the election must be
made by filing in the Court and mailing or delivering to the personal
representative, if any, a petition for the elective share within nine
months after the date of the decedent's death, or within six months
after the probate of the decedent's will, whichever limitation last
expires. The surviving spouse shall give notice of the time and place
set for hearing to persons interested in the estate and to the distributees and recipients of portions of the augmented estate whose interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the elective share.
Except as provided in subsection (b), the decedent's reclaimable estate, described in Section 2-202(a)(2), is not included within the augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective share, if the
petition is filed later than nine months after the decedent's death.
(b) Within nine months after the decedent's death, the surviving
spouse can petition the Court for an extension of time for making
an election. If, within nine months after the decedent's death, the
spouse gives notice of the petition to all persons interested in the
decedent's reclaimable estate, the Court for cause shown by the surviving spouse may extend the time for election. If the Court grants
the spouse's petition for an extension, the decedent's reclaimable
estate, described in Section 2-202(a)(2), is not excluded from the augmented estate for the purpose of computing the elective-share and
supplemental elective-share amounts, if the spouse makes an election
by filing in the Court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a petition for-the elective share within the time
allowed by the extension.
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(c) The surviving spouse may withdraw his [or her] demand for
an elective share at any time before entry of a final determination
by the Court.
(d) After notice and hearing, the Court shall determine the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts, and shall order
its payment from the assets of the augmented estate or by contribution as appears appropriate under Section 2-207. If it appears that
a fund or property included in the augmented estate has not come
into the possession of the personal representative, or has been distributed by the personal representative, the Court nevertheless shall
fix the liability of any person who has any interest in the fund or
property or who has possession thereof, whether as trustee or otherwise. The proceeding may be maintained against fewer than all
persons against whom relief could be sought, but no person is subject
to contribution in any greater amount than he [or she] would have
been under Section 2-207 if relief had been secured against all persons
subject to contribution.
(e) An order or judgment of the Court may be enforced as necessary in suit for contribution' or payment in other courts of this
State or other jurisdictions.
SECTION 2-206.

EFFECT OF ELECTION ON STATUTORY
BENEFITS.

If the right of election is exercised by or on behalf of the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse's homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, if any, are not charged against but are
in addition to the elective-share and supplemental elective-share
amounts.

SECTION 2-207.

CHARGING SPOUSE WITH OWNED
ASSETS AND GIFTS RECEIVED; LIABILITIES OF OTHERS FOR BALANCE
OF ELECTIVE SHARE.

(a) Elective-Share Amount Only. In a proceeding for an elective
share, the following are applied first to satisfy the elective-share
amount and to reduce or eliminate any contributions due from the 82
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decedent's probate estate and recipients of the decedent's reclaimable
estate:
(1) Amounts included in the augmented estate that pass or
have passed to the surviving spouse by testate or intestate succession,
(2) Amounts included in the augmented estate under Section
2-202(a)(3),
(3) Amounts included in the augmented estate that would have
passed to the spouse but were disclaimed, and
(4) Amounts included in the augmented estate under Section
2-202(a)(4) up to the applicable percentage thereof. For purposes of
the preceding sentence, the "applicable percentage" is twice the elective-share percentage set forth in the schedule in Section 2-201(a)
appropriate to the length of time the spouse and the decedent were
married to each other.
(b) Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share Amount; Supplemental
Elective-Share Amount. If, after the application of subsection (a),
the elective-share amount is not fully satisfied, or, if the surviving
spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount, amounts
included in the decedent's probate estate and that portion of the
decedent's reclaimable estate other than amounts irrevocably transferred within two years before the decedent's death are applied first
to satisfy the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or the
supplemental elective-share amount. The decedent's probate estate
and that portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate are so applied
that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount
or for the supplemental elective-share amount is equitably apportioned among the recipients of the decedent's probate estate and that
portion of the decedent's reclaimable estate in proportion to the value
of their interests therein.
(c) Unsatisfied Balance of Elective-Share and Supplemental Elective-Share Amounts. If, after the application of subsections (a) and
(b), the elective-share or supplemental elective-share amount is not
fully satisfied, the remaining portion of the decedent's reclaimable
estate is so applied that liability for the unsatisfied balance of the
amount is equitably ap-83
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portioned among the recipients of that portion of the decedent's
reclaimable estate in proportion to the value of their interests therein.
(d) Liability of Recipients of Reclaimable Estate and Their Donees. Only original recipients of the reclaimable estate described in
Section 2-202(a)(2), and the donees of the recipients of the reclaimable estate to the extent the donees have the property or its proceeds,
are liable to make a proportional contribution toward satisfaction
of the surviving spouse's elective-share or supplemental elective-share
amount. A person liable to make contribution may choose to give
up the proportional part of the reclaimable estate or to pay the value
of the amount for which he [or she] is liable.
Part 3
SPOUSE AND CHILDREN PROVIDED FOR IN WILLS
SECTION 2-301.

ENTITLEMENT OF SPOUSE; PREMARITAL WILL.

(a) If the testator's surviving spouse married the testator after
the testator executed his [or her] will, the surviving spouse is entitled
to receive, as an intestate share, no less than the value of the share
of the estate he (or she] would have received if the testator had died
intestate as to that portion of the testator's estate, if any, that neither
is devised to a child of the testator who was born before the testator
married the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving
spouse nor is devised or passes under Sections 2-603 or 2-604 to a
descendant of such a child, unless:
(1) It appears from the will or other evidence that the will
was made in contemplation of the testator's marriage to the surviving
spouse;
(2) The will expresses the intention that it is to be effective
notwithstanding any subsequent marriage; or
(3) The testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by the testator's statements or is reasonably inhttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss1/3
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(b) In satisfying the share provided by this section, devises made
by the will to the testator's surviving spouse, if any, are applied first,
and other devises (other than a devise to a child of the testator who
was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and who
is not a child of the surviving spouse or a devise or substitute gift
under Sections 2-603 or 2- 604 to a descendant of such a child) abate
as provided in Section 3-902.
SECTION 2-302.

OMITTED CHILDREN.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if a testator fails to
provide in his [or her] will for any of his [or her] children born or
adopted after the execution of the will, the omitted after-born or
after-adopted child receives a share in the estate as follows:
(1) If the testator had no child living when he [or she] executed
the will, an omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share
in the estate equal in value to that which he [or she] would have
received if the testator had died intestate, unless the will devised all
or substantially all the estate to the other parent of the omitted child
and that other parent survives the testator and is entitled to take
under the will.
(2) If the testator had one or more children living when he
[or she] executed the will, and the will devised property or an interest
in property to one or more of the then-living children, an omitted
after-born or after-adopted child is entitled to share in the testator's
estate as follows:
(i) The portion of the testator's estate in which the omitted
after-born or after-adopted child is entitled to share is limited to
devises made to the testator's then-living children under the will.
(ii) The omitted after-born or after-adopted child is entitled
to receive the share of the testator's estate, as limited in subparagraph
(i), that he [or she] would have received if the testator had included
all omitted after-born and after-adopted children with the children
to whom devises were made under the will and had given an equal
share of the estate to each child.
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(ii) To the extent feasible, the interest granted an omitted
after-born or after-adopted child under this section must be of the
same character, whether equitable or legal, present or future, as that
devised to the testator's then-living children under the will.
(iv) In satisfying a share provided by this paragraph, devises to the testator's children who were living when the will was
executed abate ratably. In abating the devises of the then-living children, the Court shall preserve to the maximum extent possible the
character of the testamentary plan adopted by the testator.
(b) Neither subsections (a)(1) nor (a)(2) apply if:
(1) It appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
or
(2) The testator provided for the omitted after-born or afteradopted child by transfer outside the will and the intent that the
transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by the testator's statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence.
(c) If at the time of execution of the will the testator falls to
provide in his [or her] will for a living child solely because he [or
she] believes the child to .be dead, the child receives a share in the
estate equal in value to that which he [or she] would have received
if the testator had died intestate.
(d) In satisfying a share provided by subsections (a)(1) or (c),
devises made by the will abate under Section 3-902.
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